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VAT REDUCTION AND TAX INCIDENCE:  
EVIDENCE FROM A FINNISH VAT REFORM ON RESTAURANT SERVICES 
 
Relative to the comprehensive theoretical literature on tax incidence, the empirical research on the 
subject is still sparse. The purpose of this thesis is to complement the research on tax incidence by 
studying a tax reform on restaurant services in Finland in 2010. The case study concentrates on 
defining the consumer price effects of a value-added tax (VAT) reduction of nine percentage points. In 
addition to the case study, an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on positive 
and normative aspects of commodity taxation is provided.  
The study utilizes the difference-in-differences method with fixed effects specification to reveal the 
causal effect of tax reduction on consumer price. An EU level directive change facilitated a tax change 
exogenous to the economic conditions in the Finnish restaurant industry. The counterfactual price 
development is controlled by the price development in Estonian restaurants. The DID OLS with fixed 
effects is used to derive an average of the consumer price reduction based on the number of restaurants. 
The Weighted Least Squares method is applied to provide a sales-based average of the change in the 
consumer price and thus to reflect the change in the restaurant expenses of an average consumer.  
The study found undershifting of tax change to consumer prices. The price reduction of 2,3 percent 
translates into a pass-through rate of 31 percent. The chain restaurants and the restaurants belonging to 
the labor market organization and lobbyist MaRa demonstrate a higher-than-average reduction in the 
consumer price, being 4,6 percent and 4,1 percent, respectively. The sales-weighted average of the 
pass-through rate is higher than the average based on the number of restaurants, revealing the higher 
tendency of high-sales restaurants to shift tax reduction to their prices. The sales-weighted average of 
the price effects ranges from 5,3 to 6,5 percent, corresponding to a 71 to 88 percent pass-through rate 
of tax change, depending on the definition of weights.  
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ARVONLISÄVERON VÄHENNYS JA VERON KOHTAANTO: 
TUTKIMUS SUOMEN RAVINTOLA-ALAN VEROUUDISTUKSEN SEURAUKSISTA 
 
Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on täydentää veron kohtaannosta tehtyä empiiristä tutkimusta 
hyödyntäen Suomessa vuonna 2010 toteutettua verouudistusta, jossa ravintolapalveluiden 
arvonlisäveroa laskettiin yhteensä yhdeksän prosenttiyksikön verran. Aiheesta julkaistuun 
teoreettiseen kirjallisuuteen verrattuna veron kohtaantoa on tutkittu empiirisesti vasta vähän. Tutkimus 
pyrkii selvittämään arvonlisäveron alennuksen vaikutuksen kuluttajahintaan. Lisäksi tutkielma luo 
katsauksen kulutusverotuksen teoreettiseen ja empiiriseen kirjallisuuteen sekä positiivisesta että 
normatiivisesta näkökulmasta.  
 
Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään difference-in-differences (DID) –menetelmää veronalennuksen 
kausaalisen kuluttajahintavaikutuksen selvittämiseksi. EU-tason direktiivimuutos mahdollisti 
veromuutoksen, joka oli riippumaton Suomen ravintolasektorin taloudellisesta tilanteesta. 
Veronalennuksen hintavaikutus pyritään erottamaan muista kuluttajahintaan vaikuttavista tekijöistä 
käyttämällä Viron ravintolahintojen kehitystä vaihtoehtoisen hintakehityksen kontrolloimiseen. 
Hintamuutoksen ravintoloiden määrään perustuva keskiarvo määritetään DID – menetelmällä käyttäen 
kiinteiden vaikutusten (fixed effects) mallia ravintolakohtaisten ajassa muuttumattomien tekijöiden 
huomioimiseksi. Myynnillä painotettu hintamuutoskeskiarvo saadaan Weighted Least Square -
menetelmää hyödyntäen. Jälkimmäinen estimaatti kuvaa paremmin keskimääräisen kuluttajan 
ravintolapalveluihin kuluttaman summan muutosta.  
 
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat kuluttajahintojen laskeneen veronalennuksen seurauksena keskimäärin 2,3 
prosenttia. Veronalennus siirtyi siten 31-prosenttisesti kuluttajahintoihin. Hinnanalennus oli 
keskimääräistä suurempi ketjuravintoloissa sekä alan edunvalvojajärjestö MaRaan kuuluvissa 
ravintoloissa. Edellisissä hinnan alennus oli 4,6 prosenttia, kun taas jälkimmäisissä kuluttajahinnat 
laskivat keskimäärin 4,1 prosenttia. Liikevaihdolla painotettu keskiarvo osoittaa hinnan laskeneen 
keskimääräistä enemmän myös sellaisissa ravintoloissa, joissa on suhteellisesti paljon myyntiä. 
Liikevaihdolla painotettu hintavaikutuskeskiarvo on 5,3-6,5 prosenttia riippuen painojen 
määrittelytavasta.  Tällä mittarilla mitattuna veronalennus siirtyi 71-88-prosenttisesti hintoihin. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation and background 
Value-added tax (VAT) has become an important source of tax income in modern economies 
(OECD 2006). It is the most common form of commodity taxation, and it is applied generally 
in nearly all OECD countries with the exception of the United States. Its contribution to the 
total tax income has increased in Finland during the last 15 years, being the only source of tax 
income of the kind (Statistics Finland 2010). The increasing use of the tax instrument 
emphasizes the significance of appropriate VAT rates and system design. In the past, 
variation in tax rates has risen from the needs of public finance. Also unemployment, 
environmental issues and varying health concerns have been addressed by either raising or 
decreasing the VAT rates. Recently, many developed economies have had to revise the VAT 
system to answer to the future challenges of globalization, environmental threats and aging 
population (Mirrlees et al 2011, Ministry of Finance 2010b). This thesis will focus on 
studying tax incidence, i.e. the distribution of tax burden between producer and consumer; a 
subject studied disproportionately little compared to its relevance regarding the success of tax 
policies.  
The tax reforms are many times targeted to influence demand or to build up employment in 
the sector in question (e.g. EUR-Lex 1999). When a reform is discussed, it is often assumed 
that the whole tax change is reflected in consumer price, which then induces the desired 
effects on demand and sector employment. The assumption is not limited to political debate; 
also, many applied studies on commodity taxation, e.g. studies on environmental taxation 
(Fullerton and Kim (2008), West and Williams (2004), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen and van 
Haefen (2009) etc.), disregard the considerations of tax incidence, i.e. whether the consumer 
actually bears the whole burden of taxes. The subject has not been studied extensively, and 
the existing theoretical and empirical research seems to suggest that the full pass-through of 
tax to consumer prices might only be a special case. As the price responses define the 
potential extent of the indirect consequences of a tax reform, the tax incidence deserves to be 
studied in more depth. 
Studying tax incidence algebraically in the partial equilibrium framework indicates that the 
price responses depend largely on demand and supply characteristics. When supply is a lot 
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more elastic than demand, as is assumed in the long-run case of perfect competition, the 
model predicts nearly complete shifting of taxes to consumer prices. The application of partial 
equilibrium framework, however, implies a number of restrictions on market behavior. 
Considering tax incidence with supply inelasticities or in imperfectly competitive markets 
shows that full shifting is rather an exception. These supply inelasticities may be short-run, or 
spur from permanent market characteristics, such as barriers in market entry. Marginal costs, 
the level of competition and demand characteristics define the amount of pass-through in the 
case of imperfect competition, concavity of demand resulting in tax undershifting. Full 
consumer price response follows only in the case of Bertrand competition. (Myles 1995.) 
For defining the relation of theoretical predictions and the reality, empirical research is crucial. 
Although the number of the studies on the subject is increasing, research applying scientific 
methods is still limited to a few research papers and the results remain mixed.  Evidence of 
full pass-through and over- and undershifting have all been found by researchers. Poterba 
(1996) studied tax incidence in three commodity groups with a city-specific consumer price 
index data from the United States. Full shifting of taxes was found during the 1947-1977 
period while the estimates from the earlier data set from the Depression period indicated 
undershifting of taxes to consumer prices. Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2009) found instant 
and full shifting of gasoline taxes to consumer prices studying a monthly data set from 50 U.S. 
states. The urban, more competitive states exhibited slightly higher pass-through rates than 
the rural ones.  
Besley and Rosen (1999) discovered differing results from an 8-year quarterly U.S. data set 
on consumer prices of well-specified commodities. For more than half of the goods studied, 
the pass-through estimates indicated overshifting of taxes while for the rest complete shifting 
cannot be statistically rejected.  As opposed to Besley and Rosen, Doyle and Samphantharak 
(2008) found undershifting of excise taxes to gasoline prices in the context of tax suspensions. 
Following tax reinstatements, taxes were passed on by 80-100 percent. The research was 
conducted on daily U.S. data set using price development in the neighboring states to control 
for counterfactual price development.  
In Finland, Peltoniemi and Varjonen (2010) examined a tax reform on groceries. The tax 
reduction resulted in a sharp decrease in consumer prices. The price reduction translated into a 
121 percent pass-through rate when the goods experiencing high seasonal variation were 
excluded from the examination. Kosonen (2010) studied tax incidence on hairdressing 
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services in the context of a tax reduction of 14 percentage points. A difference-in-differences 
set-up was used to disentangle the causal price effect of the tax reform from other price-
affecting factors. Kosonen estimated a pass-through rate of tax of around 60 percent. 
Additionally, Kosonen found variation in consumer price responses across firm types, the 
large corporations exhibiting the highest pass-through rates.   
The mixed results reflect the lack of consensus of the implications of the tax changes. The 
differences in the results may partly be attributed to market power. Also, the variation across 
studies might result from differences in the specification of the goods examined, the reasoning 
behind executing a tax policy or the methods applied for controlling other price-affecting 
variation. Above all, the contradicting results stress the necessity for further examination of 
tax incidence. This thesis aims to contribute to the understudied field of tax incidence by 
analyzing a short-term consumer price change in the context of a Finnish VAT reform on 
restaurant services in 2010. 
1.2. Objective, methodology and findings 
The principal research problems of the thesis could be formulated as What consequences does 
setting or changing the value added tax induce? What determines the potential extent of the 
effects of a tax reduction? For a comprehensive view, these questions are addressed first by 
providing an overview of the tax incidence theory and the predicted impacts of the tax 
changes. Second, a normative analysis of commodity taxation is presented. The normative 
theories investigate how an optimal commodity tax system should be organized. Approaching 
commodity taxation from a normative aspect provides insight on effective taxation and the 
use of differentiated tax rates. Then, a review of empirical literature on tax incidence 
enlightens the link between tax incidence theory and the reality and goes over the existing 
evidence of the pass-through rates. Finally, a case study of tax incidence on Finnish restaurant 
industry is performed to further illustrate the subject.  
The case study concentrates on estimating the consumer price change originated by the tax 
reform in the Finnish restaurant industry in 2010. An EU-level directive change provided an 
exogenous source of state-level variation in the tax policy and facilitated the application of 
natural experiment design for studying the causal consumer price reactions. The causality of 
price development to the tax reform is taken notice of by using a control group of Estonian 
restaurants to distinguish the effect of the tax reform from other factors contributing to the 
price development. A micro-level data set, collected from a randomized sample of restaurants 
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before and after the tax reform, allowed the derivation of exact pass-through estimates. The 
method applied in our study is the difference-in-differences (DID) technique with fixed 
effects specification. To reflect the extent in which the tax change affects the restaurant 
expenses of an average consumer, a sales-weighted average is estimated in addition to the 
average based on the number of the restaurants.  
Independent on whether a number-based or a sales-based average of the consumer price 
reduction is observed, the estimates indicate undershifting of the tax change. The estimate for 
the average causal effect of the tax reduction on consumer prices is -2,3 percent, 
corresponding to a 31 percent pass-through rate. The chain restaurants and the restaurants 
belonging to the labor market organization and lobbyist MaRa demonstrated a higher-than-
average reduction in consumer price, being 4,6 percent and 4,1 percent, respectively. The 
estimate of the sales-weighted average of the price reduction varies between -5 - 6,5 percent, 
depending on the highly arbitrary choice of weight. This translates into a 71 - 88 percent pass-
through rate.  
Our results are supported by two other studies examining the Finnish 2010 VAT reform by 
Peltoniemi and Varjonen (2011) and Harju and Kosonen (2010). Our data set, collected by the 
Government Institute for Economic Research, was utilized also in the latter research paper. 
Additionally, the method applied is the same. As for Peltoniemi and Varjonen (2010), the 
researchers used a distinct method and data set. Both studies found evidence of undershifting 
of tax reduction to consumer prices as a consequence of the reform. Although this result 
contradicts some of the earlier research, it is in line with the principal reference studies by 
Doyle & Samphantharak (2008) and Kosonen (2010), whose methods also incorporate 
considerations on policy endogeneity and counterfactual price development. Correspondingly, 
these studies found undershifting as a response to tax reductions. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. In the second chapter, the general properties of VAT and 
the EU and Finnish level legislation governing VAT collection are introduced. Chapter 3 
presents the predictions of the economic theory regarding the tax incidence both in 
competitive and imperfectly competitive markets. Then, in Chapter 4, a limited analysis of the 
normative aspects of commodity taxation is provided. Chapter 5 represents the empirical 
research on tax incidence. Background, methods and the data set are introduced in Chapter 6, 
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and in Chapter 7 the empirical analysis is carried out. Chapter 8 discusses the outcomes of the 
empirical analysis, and Chapter 9 concludes.   
2. VAT in general 
 
2.1. General properties of VAT 
Value added tax is a general, broad-based consumption tax, assessed on a sale of good as a 
percentage of the good’s value. VAT is charged at the time of selling, and it is remitted to the 
tax authorities by the seller. The amount of tax is calculated as a percentage of the producer 
price. The consumer price thus consists of two components: the producer price and the VAT. 
The seller remits the tax forward, deducted by the amount of tax that has been charged as a 
part of the input prices. This property of VAT ensures that the tax only falls on the value 
added in the production, so that taxes do not overlap.  
The most common forms of commodity taxation are an ad valorem tax and a specific, or a 
unit tax. Ad valorem translates from Latin to ‘according to value’: the amount of tax is based 
on the value of the good rather than the number of units produced or sold. VAT, being 
proportional to the value of the good, is an ad valorem tax.  
Whereas the amount of VAT is based on the value of a good, the unit tax is often a given sum 
per one unit sold. Excise tax is a tax set on the production of the good for sale within a 
country. These taxes are typically unit taxes. Examples of goods subject to excise taxes are 
alcohol beverages, tobacco and gasoline. The amount of alcohol tax, for instance, is typically 
determined by the product’s concentration of ethyl alcohol in volume units.  
The value added tax was introduced in Finland in 1994 (FINLEX 1993) when the former 
sales tax was substituted and the tax system was reformed to comply with the EU directives. 
The VAT becoming more general has been a typical development in industrialized countries: 
over the last decades, nearly all OECD countries except for the United States have adopted 
the use of VAT (OECD 2006). The US sales tax system forms the most significant exception 
to the VAT adoption pattern globally. In Finland, around 15 billion euros of tax revenue are 
collected through VAT every year (Statistics Finland 2010). It accounts for roughly 20 
percent of the total tax income. As demonstrated in Exhibit 1, VAT has been the only type of 
tax with a constant or growing share of the total tax revenue over the last fifteen years.  
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Exhibit 1. Sources of tax revenue in Finland. 
 Source: Statistics Finland (2010). 
VAT possesses certain useful characteristics. As the seller can deduct the taxes included in 
the input prices from the tax bill, no taxes are levied on intermediate goods. This property fits 
the Diamond-Mirrlees production efficiency result (1971a) which, given a set of assumptions, 
supports no taxes on intermediate goods for ensuring production efficiency; even though 
distortions in consumption are inevitable for collecting tax income, distortions in production 
should not be allowed. Though the assumptions by Diamond and Mirrlees are many times not 
met in reality, the production efficiency result provides an important guideline for commodity 
taxation and is a weighty argument in the favor of VAT. 
The fractional nature is another favorable property of VAT. VAT is collected at each stage of 
the production chain, and thus remitted forward to tax authorities in smaller disbursements. 
The VAT paid at the sale of the good to the final consumer indeed accounts for the whole 
amount of value added in the production process. However, the final seller only remits to the 
tax authorities this tax deducted by the input taxes – the input taxes have been remitted 
forward earlier in the production chain. Thus, the loss associated with possible tax evasions in 
the production chain is smaller than with e.g. a retail sales tax. Moreover, the benefit of tax 
evasion being smaller, also the incentive for tax evasion is lower with VAT. (Mirrlees et al 
2011.)  
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Internationally the most general way to organize VAT in cross-border trade is the destination 
principle. In the trade between different countries, it is applied for equitable treatment of 
imports and domestically supplied goods. According to the principle, taxation takes place 
where the goods are consumed. Thus, exports are left untaxed and imports are taxed at the 
domestic rates. The destination principle sets the imported and domestically supplied goods in 
the same position; both face the same VAT rate. (Mirrlees et al 2011.) 
As a drawback of the destination principle, the fractional nature of VAT is lost in cross-border 
trade. As the exports are zero rated, there are no deductions to claim by the importer. At the 
sale, importer then collects VAT for the total value of the product.  The net VAT liabilities 
become large, and problems with compliance arise. The Missing Trader Intra-Community 
(MTIC) fraud occurs when importer disappears without remitting the tax forward to the 
Government. Carousel fraud is a form of MTIC fraud with a chain of defrauder companies 
involved. The costs from MTIC frauds are substantial, and rethinking the destination principle 
in such a way that these frauds could be avoided remains a future challenge. (Mirrlees et al 
2011, Chapter 7.) 
2.2. VAT legislation at the EU level 
Finland, as a member state of the European Union, must comply with the Union’s VAT 
Directives. The harmonized VAT legislation for the Union countries has been developed to 
promote efficient functioning of the union-wide inner market. Value-added tax must be paid 
on goods that are consumed in the Union area. Thus, sales to be consumed outside of the 
Union area are typically tax free. (European Commission Taxation and Customs Union A.) 
The aim of the Union-wide system is to tax goods and services in the country of consumption. 
The system is origin-based for a single consumer: the VAT rate applied to a consumer’s 
purchases is determined by the legislation of the country of purchase, with the exception of 
consumers outside European Union. However, the destination principle, explained in the 
previous section, is applied to the trade between taxable persons
1
. (European Commission 
Taxation and Customs Union A.) 
VAT legislation in the Union is to a large extent based on the Directive 2006/112/EC. In most 
cases, the consumption goods are subject to a general VAT rate of at least 15%. In addition, 
the directive allows the application of one or two reduced rates. Both these rates must be 
                                                     
1
 “For VAT purposes, a taxable person is any individual, partnership, company or whatever which supplies 
taxable goods and services in the course of business.” (European Commission Taxation and Customs Union) 
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equal or above 5%, and they can only be applied to goods and services determined in the 
VAT Directives. EU legislation sets a minimum to the rates, not exact rates to be applied. 
Also, supplies of certain goods are exempt from VAT. For example education and certain 
financial services belong to this group. In addition to these simple rules, the VAT system is 
complicated by the numerous derogations granted to the member states. Some member states 
are allowed to apply zero rates on certain groups of goods and services due to their country-
specific circumstances. (European Commission Taxation and Customs Union B.)  
Labor-intensive services are subject to special treatment in the EU VAT legislation. In 1999, 
European Union adopted a directive that allowed the application of reduced VAT rates on 
certain labor intensive services (EUR-Lex 1999). The directive was enacted to explore the 
effects of reduced VAT rates on employment and the size of the black economy on an 
experimental basis. The services specified included hairdressing and repairs of bicycles, shoes 
and leather goods, among others. The reduced rates were extended several times until, in 2009, 
Directive 2009/47/EC was enacted. The directive allowed the application of reduced VAT 
rates on a permanent basis and included restaurant services within their scope. The 
enforcement of the reduced rates was set voluntary. The directive came into force in June 
2009. (EUR-Lex 2009.)  
2.3. VAT legislation at the Finnish level 
The Finnish VAT legislation corresponds to the EU VAT directives and also defines the exact 
rates applied in the Finnish taxation. Åland forms an exception, as the group of islands was 
negotiated a special status and left outside the taxation union when Finland joined the group 
of Union countries in 1995 (Tax Administration).  
In Finland, the general VAT rate is set at 23%. It was raised by one percentage point from 22% 
in 2010. The reduced rates are 9% for e.g. medicine, transportation, books, accommodation 
services, subscriptions for newspapers and tickets to cultural events, and 13% for food, non-
alcoholic beverages, restaurant services and feed. The sale of a large watercraft not used for 
amusement purposes is zero-rated. (Ministry of Finance 2010a, FINLEX 2011.) 
In 2006, Finland joined the group of countries experimenting with labor-intensive services 
(FINLEX 2006). Reduced VAT rates were applied to hairdressing and small repairing 
services of bicycles, shoes and leather goods, clothing and linen. The tax rate of 22 percent 
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was decreased to 8 percent from the beginning of 2007. The originally three-year experiment 
was extended in 2010 to last for an additional year (FINLEX 2010).  
In 2009, the VAT for groceries was reduced to 12 percent, the lower of the reduced rates at 
the time (FINLEX 2008). As a consequence of the reduction, the gap between the VAT rates 
in food from grocery stores and restaurants increased to ten percentage points. Take away 
food and meals eaten in a restaurant were treated differently in taxation, sales of the take away 
food benefiting from the lower rate. The unequal taxation of the two led to growing pressure 
to decrease VAT rates for the restaurant services as well (Taloussanomat 2009b, Elonen et al 
2009 etc.).   
After Directive 2009/47/EC allowed the application of reduced VAT rates on restaurant 
services, France and Belgium were the first countries to put the tax reduction in action 
(Peltoniemi & Varjonen 2011). Finland followed in July 2010 by decreasing the VAT rate on 
restaurant services by eight percentage points from 22 to 13 percent (FINLEX 2009a). The 
policy change was made possible by the directive change at the Union level, and as described 
in the previous section, the directive embodied other labor intensive services as well. The 
preceding facts give a credible reason to believe that the Finnish tax change was exogenous of 
the specific economic conditions on the Finnish restaurant industry. Thus, the setting is usable 
for studying the incidence of tax reduction on labor-intensive services.  
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3. Theory of tax incidence 
 
When a tax is set, is it the consumer price that increases or the producer price that decreases 
more? How is the burden of a tax distributed between the market parties? Tax incidence 
theory aims to answer these questions on a general level. For analyzing the empirical results 
provided later in Chapter 7, a theory framework on tax incidence is necessary. The impact of 
levying a tax upon the prices and the utilities of economic agents are of concern here. In 
imperfectly competitive markets, the profits of the producer are also a topic of interest. 
Tax incidence is essential when considering the consequences of a given policy. Job creation 
and fighting the informal economy were stated as the primary reasons for European 
Commission to introduce reduced VAT rates on labor-intensive services, among them 
restaurant services (EC Taxation and Customs Union C). Reaching these policy objectives 
involves a series of effects. For labor demand to increase there must be a need for additional 
supply of services. Thus, tax reduction must induce additional demand, and lower consumer 
prices are essential in achieving this. How consumer prices react as a consequence of a tax 
reduction is a subject of tax incidence theory and also the topic of our research. 
This chapter is divided into sections to study tax incidence under different intensities of 
competition. First, tax incidence under perfect competition is presented. Then, an illustration 
of tax incidence in a monopoly is provided, with restricting assumptions of linear demand and 
constant marginal costs. These restrictions are loosened in Section 3.3., where a more general 
model of tax incidence in imperfectly competitive markets is examined. 
3.1. Tax incidence under perfect competition  
3.1.1. Partial equilibrium model 
In this section, tax incidence is studied in the partial equilibrium framework under the 
assumptions of perfect competition. The partial equilibrium framework focuses on the effects 
of the tax in the market in question and ignores the interactions between markets, e.g. the 
effect of the tax on labor demand. This framework is useful in identifying the primary impacts 
of taxation. It might also be a relatively realistic description of the reality in the case that the 
markets of the taxed good are small relative to the whole economy (Tuomala 2009, 166).  
In the absence of tax, consumer price and producer price, i.e. what producer earns per one unit 
sold, are equal. Denote q = consumer price and p = producer price. The market equilibrium is 
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defined by demand and supply,                  When an ad valorem tax is imposed, 
consumer price differs from the producer price by the amount of tax. Let the tax rate be 
denoted by t, and the consumer price by         . The difference between consumer and 
producer prices is now given by tp.  
The impact of imposing a tax can be derived from the market clearing condition  
The derivation yields  
for the effect of tax on the producer price (Appendix 2).    denotes the price elasticity of 
demand and    the price elasticity of supply. Correspondingly, the tax’s effect on consumer 
price becomes  
 (Appendix 3). The effect on the demand for the good is given by  
With the new price         , the consumer is likely to consume less of the good. At the 
new market equilibrium, the amount exchanged is smaller, the consumer price is higher and 
the producer price is lower.  
The formula 3 above indicates that the effect of the tax on consumer price is likely to be 
between zero and the size of the tax, with the infrequent exception of the Giffen good. Note 
that when the demand is not inelastic, consumers adjust their behavior and decrease the 
consumption of the good in question. If the supply was perfectly elastic, the amount 
exchanged in the market would decrease but the producer price would not, as the firms in the 
perfectly competitive markets would price at their marginal costs. Perfectly elastic supply is, 
however, not what we usually expect when inspecting the short-term impacts on the market 
equilibrium. 
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The preceding formulas indicate that the tax burden is divided between the market parties 
based on the elasticities of supply and demand. The tax burden falls more heavily on the 
producer as a lower producer price if the demand is relatively more elastic. Correspondingly, 
the consumer ends up bearing the majority of the tax burden if the supply is more elastic than 
demand. As a rule of thumb, the tax falls more heavily on the less elastic side of the market. 
The decrease in the quantity exchanged in the market is the greater the more elastic supply 
and demand are. It should be noted that the tax is shifted forward to the consumer price by its 
whole amount only if the supply is much more elastic than the demand,      .  
As was shown above, the price responses follow from demand and supply characteristics.  In 
the framework of perfect competition, there are no barriers of entry or exit, and elastic supply 
is thus assumed in the long run. As the elasticity of supply increases, the effect of the tax on 
consumer price becomes 
Thus, in the context of perfectly elastic supply, the consumer price increases by the amount of 
the tax in the long run. Firms price at their marginal costs, and there are no pure profits. If a 
tax is introduced, the effect is equal to an upward shift in the marginal costs. Vice versa, if a 
tax is removed, the short-run profits disappear when new competitors enter the market.    
3.1.2. General equilibrium model 
By far, tax incidence has been studied in the partial equilibrium framework. In the partial 
equilibrium model, effects on the price level and other markets in the economy are not taken 
into account. Nor does the analysis include considerations of the use of the tax revenue or the 
effect of the increased tax rate on the income level. The Harberger model (1962) is often used 
to model these effects. Even though aiming to a more sophisticated description, it cannot still 
capture all relevant characteristics of the real world. Only infinitesimal taxes can be studied, 
having a zero-tax situation as a starting point.  
The Harberger model assumes a closed two-good economy with two inputs, capital and labor. 
The inputs are mobile across sectors. The production technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale. Demand is a function of relative prices and total production only; identical and 
homothetic preferences are assumed.  
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The starting point is an economy without taxes. The cost functions are proportional of 
production level, i.e. marginal costs are constant. The demand equals supply, the prices equal 
marginal costs and the total income in the economy equals the sum of factor incomes and 
GDP. This leads to a system of equations. When taxes are introduced, the system can be used 
to study their effects on the prices and quantities exchanged. It is used as a basis for 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and various analyses of existing tax systems. 
(Salanié 2003.) 
The model reveals the interactions between markets. When a value added tax is introduced in 
the commodity markets, it has an impact on the factor market equilibrium through the volume 
effect. A tax leads to an increase in the after tax price of the good. This decreases demand of 
the good. In the factor market, labor demand decreases consequently if the sector in question 
is relatively labor intensive. This, in turn, reduces the relative labor income. (Salanié 2003.) 
The Harberger model provides a basis for outlining the job creation argument by the 
European Commission. A tax decrease on labor-intensive services is expected to induce the 
following volume effect: prices decrease, demand for restaurant services shifts upwards and 
labor demand increases. Alongside, this is likely to boost wages and employment. 
There is another supportive argument for the success of the policy objectives that is related to 
the labor-intensity of the sector. Typically, labor is more flexibly adjusted than capital, and 
thus supply in the labor-intensive sectors can be assumed more elastic than in the capital-
intensive ones. In the restaurant industry, both supply and demand can thus be reckoned 
relatively elastic. Based on the suggestive partial equilibrium formulas 2-4, the theory thereby 
predicts large demand effects in the industry. 
Analyzing tax incidence under perfect competition provides a framework for considering the 
impacts of imposing a tax. However, many factors are known to contradict the assumptions of 
perfect competition, and imperfect competition is often considered as a more realistic 
representation of reality.  In the next section, tax incidence under market power is studied. 
3.2. Tax incidence in monopoly 
Tax incidence becomes more complex when relaxing the assumption of perfect competition. 
Firms do not set prices at the level of marginal costs, but above. The firms make non-zero 
profits, and these profits will also be influenced by taxation.   
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For a monopoly, the price setting behavior differs from that of a firm in perfectly competitive 
markets. The monopoly producer has to consider the effect of the pricing decision on 
consumers’ behavior. The monopolist faces decreasing marginal revenue curve arising from 
the adjustments of consumption by consumers in the association with price changes. The 
monopolist maximizes  
 , where      is a decreasing function in price.  
By assuming linear demand          and constant marginal costs     , profit 
maximization yields the effects of the tax change 
(Appendix 4). As a is naturally above zero, this is always smaller than one and thus indicates 
a pass-through rate of less than 100%. This is, however, a formula developed as a result of 
many restrictive assumptions.  
With linear demand, theory predicts an increase in the price less than the amount of tax. 
However, when restricting the assumptions, taxes can also shift to prices more than 
completely; this is the case when the marginal cost curve for the monopolist slopes 
downwards, which is a theoretical and unlikely case, accompanied with sufficient concavity 
in the demand for monopolist’s product (Bishop 1968).   
The little illustrative example with linear demand function was derived to demonstrate how 
the tax incidence in a monopoly differs from that in perfect competition, when all market 
power is possessed by only one market actor. The analysis in the next section allows for 
varying levels of competition and a more general form of the demand function.  
3.3. Tax incidence in oligopoly 
The analysis of tax incidence under imperfect competition follows that of Myles (1995). 
Myles introduces a general equilibrium economy model, where part of the economy is 
imperfectly competitive. The representation provides a general framework for considering tax 
incidence for varying intensities of competition. To simplify the analysis, the results are 
derived for a specific, i.e. unit, tax. 
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Assume we have an industry with a fixed number mi of firms, with identical cost functions 
and the same expectations of other firms’ behavior. The equality of firms in these respects 
implies the existence of equilibrium, with all firms producing the same amount of output. 
Labor is the only input used in the production, and labor markets are competitive, with 
constant returns to scale. The inverse demand function for the industry is denoted by  
, where    is the consumer price of good i,   
  
the output of firm j and    some representative 
other price, reflecting that the demand is also affected by the prices of other goods. Firms 
maximize profit, taking into account the impact of their production decisions on the price qi. 
The profit function for firm i is  
 The cost function     
   is the same for all firms in the industry.  
Then, assume that each firm holds an expectation, i.e. a conjecture, of how the other firms 
will react on its choice of production level. The conjecture can be defined as 
 , i.e. how the firm’s production decision changes the decisions of others. As the profit 
maximizing condition becomes 
, we are able to interpret λ.      reflects the situation where the set of firms would behave 
together like a monopoly and maximize the sum of profits.     represents Cournot behavior, 
i.e. firms maximize their profits given the reaction functions of other firms in the market. 
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When λ=0, the producer price equals the marginal costs2. This situation arises as a result of 
Bertrand price competition.  
The total derivative of the consumer price    with respect to tax rate    can be used to assess 
the effect of imposing a tax on the consumer price, or, in other words, the degree of forward 
shifting. It is given by 
To derive this, marginal costs are assumed to be constant,    .  
The result above proves that a full pass-through of taxes is in most cases inadequate 
assumption under imperfect competition. The degree of forward shifting, given by the 
formula, only equals one, or 100%, when    , as is the case with Bertrand competition. The 
degree of forward shifting depends on demand curvature. In the case of overshifting, the 
prices shift by more than the change in the tax is and 
   
   
    The condition for overshifting 
can be written as  
The tax is overshifted, when the slope of the inverse demand curve, 
    
   
  , is positive and there 
is sufficient convexity in the inverse demand function. Undershifting, prices increasing by 
less than the increase in the tax, occurs when demand is concave. The tendency for either 
over- or undershifting holds both for monopoly and oligopoly – only with Bertrand 
competition,    , the pass-through rate is 100%.  
The precise effect on profits can be derived by differentiating the profit with respect to ti. The 
profit can be written as 
, and derivating with respect to ti and reformulating yields 
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Surprisingly, following a tax increase, firms’ profits may even increase; the denominator can 
take both a positive or a negative sign. The decrease in production levels of firms as a 
consequence of tax might move the oligopoly equilibrium towards the joint profit 
maximization situation, the collusive outcome, naturally without implying actual collusive 
actions.  
The general equilibrium model of Myles also considers the effect of a tax on prices of the 
goods from other sectors. Levying a tax on some other commodity k induces a change in 
commodity i’s price and in the profit of the producer of good i.  Since the indirect demand of 
good i can be written as  
, differentiating with respect to tk yields  
The change in the price of good i might be of either sign and thus, the price of good i may 
either decrease or increase following a tax change for good k. The direction of the effect 
depends on the rate of complementarity between the goods.  
Imperfect competition also brings up the different impacts of specific and ad valorem taxation 
on consumer price, tax revenue and profits. Whereas these two forms of commodity taxation 
are found equivalent with respect to incidence and distribution of welfare in perfect 
competition, the equivalence does not hold under market power (Salanié 2003, pp. 21-22).  
Delipalla and Keen (1992) examine two models of oligopoly with homogenous products, one 
with free entry and another with a fixed number of firms. They find that overshifting is less 
likely to occur with ad valorem taxes than specific taxes – ad valorem taxation is associated 
with a lower consumer price. A lower consumer price implies less distortion in consumer 
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behavior and thus higher tax revenue. As was pointed above, taxation can in fact increase 
producer’s surplus in the context of market power. In the model with deterred entry, Delipalla 
and Keen show that these socially undesirable profits to firms are relatively lower with ad 
valorem taxes. 
Anderson, de Palma and Kreider (2001a) demonstrate that the results on profits and price 
effects can be generalized to an oligopoly with differentiated products and Bertrand 
competition: consumer prices are lower and the profits to firms smaller with ad valorem taxes. 
However, in another paper from 2001 Anderson et al. (2001b) call into question the 
superiority of ad valorem taxes to unit taxes with respect to their welfare effects in Bertrand 
oligopoly with product differentiation.  
To conclude, on the contrary to what is often assumed, imposing a tax might increase the 
good’s price by more or less than the amount of tax. The less-than-complete pass-through of 
taxes to consumer prices might be associated to perfect competition with relatively inelastic 
supply, or alternatively, to market power. In the latter case, the degree of forward shifting, or 
whether the tax is over- or undershifted, depends on the curvature of the demand curve. The 
pass-through rate equals one only in the case of Bertrand competition. Imposing a tax in one 
sector also affects the prices on other sectors due to the induced effects of the tax. 
Surprisingly, a tax increase might actually boost the profits of the firms as the equilibrium 
moves closer to the monopoly equilibrium. The differences in tax incidence between the ad 
valorem and specific taxes also become relevant in association with market power. 
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4. Literature on optimal commodity taxation 
 
Taxing commodities is an important source of tax revenue. Nevertheless, taxation causes a 
welfare loss in the economy. Setting a tax results in a higher consumer price and lower 
demand. The decrease in demand consists of two distinct effects.  First, the income effect is a 
consequence of diminishing purchasing power. When the consumer price increases, the net 
wealth after consumption decreases. Second, the substitution effect arises from the change in 
the relative prices of goods. The consumer is likely to replace consumption of the taxed good 
with consumption of another, now relatively cheaper commodity. The substitution effect is 
the source of distortions and leads to a deadweight loss in the economy, as this part of welfare 
is not shifted between the market parties involved but disappears as a result of taxation. 
(Tuomala 2009.)  
There are numerous theories on the optimal tax rates of the commodities. The models 
represented here have done important contributions regarding the rules for defining the 
optimal tax rates for each good. The normative theories on commodity taxation often combine 
the revenue raising target of taxation with the minimization of economic distortions. Frank 
Ramsey (1927) aimed in his analysis on optimal commodity taxation to determine a tax 
system that simply maximizes economic efficiency. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b) revised 
his results by adding different marginal utilities of money and social welfare weights to 
different types of consumers. Myles (1989) relaxed the assumption of perfect competition 
present in the preceding two models and derived optimal commodity tax rules for monopoly 
and oligopoly. Corlett and Hague (1953) provided a contribution to the theories of optimal 
commodity taxation by considering the optimal relations between tax rates on various types of 
goods. These theories provide a normative framework for considering optimal commodity 
taxation.  
The theories by Ramsey, Diamond and Mirrlees and Myles all approach optimal commodity 
taxation from a common angle. The distortions and welfare loss of taxation are minimized 
under varying sets of assumptions, given that the tax revenue collection target is fulfilled. 
Corlett and Hague have a different perspective. They define a three-good system and inspect 
the relations between the tax rates of the goods in the presence of income taxes.  
The main model in the Corlett-Hague analysis concludes that if leisure cannot be taxed, the 
goods complementary to leisure should be taxed more heavily. Thus, leisure-associated 
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consumption could be used as a tool to encourage working. As the consumption in restaurant 
services per person stands at 1093 euro a year in Finland, being a modest amount of 3,6 
percent of the total per person consumption (Statistics Finland 2009), even radical changes in 
the prices of the services might not affect labor participation. Additionally, if the restaurant 
services were taxed more heavily, the effect on working would be ambivalent; whereas leisure 
can be complementary with dining, having lunch may be complementary with working. Thus, 
Corlett-Hague analysis will be left without further consideration, as the other above-
mentioned theories might provide more helpful tools for analyzing the optimal design of 
commodity taxes in the context of restaurant services. 
To simplify the notation, most of the analysis in this chapter is derived for a specific tax, not 
for ad valorem tax. The qualitative implications of the results, however, apply to value-based 
taxes as well. 
4.1. The first-best solution: Lump-sum taxes 
Several sources consider lump-sum taxes as the most efficient way of organizing commodity 
taxation (Mirrlees et al 2011, Myles 1995, Tuomala 2009 etc.). However, most sources also 
exclude this tax system from the set of available tax instruments. The theoretically appealing 
system will be described here, and the obstacles in implementing such a system in practice 
will be presented.   
Consider the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Suppose that in a two-
person economy, there is a consumption array [           ] with two goods x and y, forming a 
Pareto optimum such that at least one household is not satiated. Then, given convex 
preferences and production sets, continuous preferences and that     is interior to the 
consumption set of h, there exists a set of prices      such that [            ]  is a 
competitive equilibrium. In other words, any competitive, Pareto optimal equilibrium in the 
economy can be reached and sustained by redistributing the initial allocations and then 
allowing markets to work. (Myles 1995.) 
The theorem states that any Pareto-optimal outcome preferred by the policy maker can be 
reached by lump-sum redistributions of endowments. The redistributive methods could be 
taxation or income transfers. In this setting, consumers would not be able to affect the level of 
taxation by adjusting their behavior and thus there would be no efficiency costs in association 
with lump-sum taxation.  
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To illustrate this, take taxes on consumption. When a tax is levied on a good, consumer will 
be paying more of this commodity and thus her disposable income after consumption will 
decrease. This is the income effect. However, as consumption of the commodity is more 
expensive now, the consumer will be buying less of the good and possibly more of another, 
substitutable good. This is the substitution effect. Thus, the consumer’s welfare decreases as 
she has to substitute from the initial consumption set to a less preferable one. But also the tax 
revenue collected by the government decreases as the consumer changes her behavior as a 
response to the tax increase. This distortive effect is not present in the context of lump-sum 
taxes: if all consumers face the same amount of lump-sum taxes independent on how they 
behave, there will be no substitution effect from one good to another. By not being distortive, 
the lump-sum taxes would be the most efficient tax instrument available.   
In practice, the future labor supply represents the endowment of the consumer. Thus, the 
lump-sum transfers should, in the light of the theory, redistribute the future labor supply. As 
the earnings capacity differs across individuals, the optimal lump-sum taxes should be based 
on relevant economic characteristics, e.g. expected future income. The earnings potential is, 
however, unobservable, and the individuals are again likely to adjust their behavior or not to 
reveal truthfully their characteristics to tax authorities to avoid tax payments. Thus, levying a 
lump-sum tax related to these characteristics may not be feasible. If not based on ability to 
pay or earnings capacity, lump-sum taxes raise a question of social equity. In most societies, 
lump-sum taxes have been excluded from the set of applicable tax instruments due to equity 
and implementation problems.  
4.2. Efficiency in commodity taxation 
As the first-best solution for organizing commodity taxation does not provide an applicable 
option, the contributions on the field of optimal commodity taxation have continued. In his 
work of 1927, Ramsey aimed to answer the following question: When government needs a 
certain amount of tax revenue to finance its expenses, how the tax rates on different 
commodities should be determined to minimize the deadweight loss associated with the 
collection of taxes. Ramsey leaves out equity considerations arising from differences in 
marginal utility of money. There are n consumption goods that are consumed in quantities 
      . There is no international trade, and all commodities are either consumed or saved. 
Labor is the only input in the model                    denotes the indirect utility of the 
consumer; there is only a single consumer or, alternatively, a population of identical 
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consumers.          is the consumer price of commodity i,    denotes the producer price. 
Tax rates are denoted by        . w is the wage earned from working, and I is the nonlabor 
income, which is assumed to equal zero in the model. The derivations are done for a unit tax 
instead of an ad valorem tax here. The results are, however, qualitatively applicable to an ad 
valorem tax as well. 
Ramsey first deals with perfectly general utility function. The tax rates ti are differentiated 
across goods so that, given the tax revenue R=∑     
 
   , the utility V is maximized. When 
R→0, the utility-maximizing solution is found to be tending to point P: the competitive 
equilibrium point also maximizing utility V in the absence of taxation. When t’s and R can be 
regarded as infinitesimals, the optimal solution is reached when 
, where    
 
∑∑    
   
   
 . The changes in the quantity demanded are thus equal for each 
commodity.  
For proceeding further in the analysis, Ramsey makes an assumption of non-homogenous, 
quadratic utility function. This implies linearity of t’s – thus, lump-sum taxes are excluded 
and taxation is necessarily distortive. Now, the preceding result applies not just to 
infinitesimal tax revenues, but to any tax revenue raised: the compensated demand should 
decrease in the same proportion for each commodity compared to the pre-tax equilibrium. Put 
differently,  
where λ is the Lagrangean coefficient; for all goods k, the utility cost of raising the tax rate 
should be the same in the proportion to the marginal revenue raised by the tax increase.   
For more intuition on what his results imply, Ramsey includes in his analysis certain specific 
cases, e.g. the case of independent goods. If the compensated cross-elasticities between the 
goods are  
   
   
        there is no substitution effect from one good to another in the 
context of price changes, and the goods are said to be independent. Thus, an increase in the 
tax on a commodity only affects other goods through the income effect. Now, ignoring the 
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interactions between markets, the general equilibrium model turns into a partial equilibrium 
one. This assumption allows further manipulation of the Ramsey rule of equal changes in 
compensated demand. The conditions on the optimal amount of tax can be rewritten as the 
inverse elasticity rule, 
, where α denotes the marginal utility of income. The optimal tax rate for a good is in an 
inverse relation to the commodity’s price elasticity of demand. 
The main intake from the Ramsey analysis is that taxation should decrease the compensated 
demand for each commodity in the same proportion. Thus, according to Ramsey’s analysis, 
commodities with a demand of lower sensibility to price changes should be taxed more 
heavily. Should be noted, however, that only in the special case of no cross-elasticities the 
linkage between the own price elasticity and tax rate is this straightforward. In other contexts, 
the interrelationships between the demands need to be taken into account.  
Ramsey theory is a theory of the second best: given that lump-sum taxes are not used and thus 
distortions cannot be avoided, it demonstrates the tax system which under these circumstances 
minimizes the distortions. As Ramsey uses the utility of a single consumer as the objective 
function, the analysis pays no attention to the questions of equity. By the Ramsey rule, goods 
with low elasticity of demand should be taxed more heavily than goods with high 
responsiveness to price changes; thus, the application of the theory suggests a low tax rate on 
restaurant services. The commodities with inelastic demand, however, are often necessities 
and consumed disproportionately by poor, and applying Ramsey rule in practice would lead to 
a highly regressive taxation. In many societies, this kind of tax system is considered 
unacceptable. Other researchers have extended Ramsey’s work by deriving the tax rule in 
context of multiple, non-identical household. The use of social welfare function for many 
households instead of a utility function for a single consumer allows the introduction of equity 
considerations in the analysis.  
4.3. Introduction of social welfare 
Ramsey’s analysis was later generalized for many consumers with differing preferences by 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b). The use of social welfare function of many households 
introduces different weights for different types of consumers in the system. Here, we continue 
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to assume simply that labor is the only input used in the production, though the result was also 
generalized by Diamond and Mirrlees for other production technologies. The indirect utility 
of a household h is                  
  , qi being the consumer price and I
h
 the nonlabor 
income. These indirect utility functions vary across households. The revenue constraint 
remains   ∑ ∑     
  
   
 
   . Social welfare function is defined as     
            . 
The maximization problem, W as the objective function, yields the tax rule 
 
is the social marginal utility of income for household h, reflecting both the society’s values, or 
social welfare weight of the household,  
  
   
, as well as the household’s marginal utility of 
income, αh. Here, the left-hand side approximately corresponds to the proportional change in 
the compensated demand for good k. Once again, this is equal for all consumption goods. If 
the tax results in a decrease in demand, which generally is the case, the left hand side is 
negative.  
The right hand side indicates that the demand changes should be smaller for goods consumed 
extensively by households with high βh and for the goods consumed in larger amounts by 
those whose tax payments are sensitive to changes in income. The former term reflects equity 
and the latter efficiency in the model. A high value of    stands for high marginal utility of 
income and high social welfare weight of the household.  If the welfare function of the society 
is concave, i.e. the changes in social welfare are higher with low income levels, the social 
welfare weight is higher for a poor household. Correspondingly, under the Diamond-Mirrlees 
optimal commodity tax rule, the decrease in demand is allowed to be greater for the goods 
consumed by households with 1) low social marginal utility of income and 2) small decreases 
in tax payments in the context of decreases in income. 
Diamond (1975) represents two cases in which the above tax rule reduces to the Ramsey rule: 
first, if the households are not given differing social valuations or, second, if the tax system 
cannot discriminate between the households. The latter occurs when consumption patterns are 
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similar in low-income and high-income households: both types consume the same amounts of 
each good relative to their income, i.e. the preferences are homothetic. When the tax rates 
cannot be chosen for redistribution, only efficiency aspects can be considered.  
4.4. Introduction of imperfect competition 
The Ramsey rule presented the least distortive commodity tax system, when lump-sum taxes 
were excluded. Diamond and Mirrlees developed Ramsey’s analysis further by adding 
considerations on equity.  These two baseline theories are, however, based on the assumption 
of perfect competition. Myles (1989) relaxes this assumption and aims to define the optimal 
commodity tax system in imperfectly competitive markets. In this context, commodity 
taxation may also have a counter-distortive effect by reducing the welfare loss associated with 
production decisions under market power. 
In perfectly competitive markets, imposing a tax necessarily creates distortions. Imperfect 
competition, however, causes welfare loss to begin with.  Myles (1987) first provides an 
example on how taxation can be used to minimize the distortions arising from imperfect 
competition. Myles presents a single-consumer economy with no revenue-raising requirement 
for taxes. There are two commodities, both produced using only labor. The consumer price of 
good i is again denoted by qi.  
We have a competitive and an imperfectly competitive market. The consumer price of the 
good produced in the competitive market is         . The price of good 2, produced in 
the imperfectly competitive industry, depends on the production decisions of the firms in the 
market and on the price of good 1, q1. In the general equilibrium model of Myles, profits are 
assumed to be taxed at a rate of 100%. The preferences of the society are represented with an 
indirect utility function. As the revenue raising target here is zero, one of the taxes will be 
negative and the other positive. If both markets were perfectly competitive, in order to avoid 
distortions the tax rates would be set at          . 
The maximization of social welfare function V yields that if  
, then dt2 should be negative. As the initial situation involved no taxes on either commodity, 
the result implies a negative tax, i.e. subsidy, on the product from the imperfectly competitive 
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industry. A situation of this kind arises when 1) 
   
   
 is large, meaning that taxes are over-
shifted, or 2) 
   
   
 is negative, i.e. commodities 1 and 2 are complements. Overshifting implies 
that a subsidy to a good with  
   
   
   is reflected in a price decrease exceeding the amount of 
the subsidy. Our setting here requires that the tax rate for perfectly competitive good should 
be positive. As the outcome of the policy, however, the overall price level decreases. Thus, 
the subsidy can be seen as an efficient means of improving welfare.  
Myles (1989) also extends the analysis and provides optimal commodity tax rules for 
imperfect competition. He first derives a single-consumer rule, which he later expands to 
cover many consumers. The general equilibrium economy consists of two sectors; the 
competitive and imperfectly competitive. In the model, the price changes as a response to the 
tax changes are not linear, interconnections between price levels of goods in different sectors 
are allowed and the taxation also impacts profits. 
Profits in the competitive markets equal zero. In the imperfectly competitive market, each 
firm makes its output choice considering three factors; its cost structure, the shape of the 
demand function and the output choices of other firms. As the model in question is a general 
equilibrium model, the demand for a good is dependent on the prices of other goods as well. 
Thus, a tax change is followed by two effects. The direct effect of the tax alters the cost 
structure of the firm and thereby changes the price of the good in question, whether supplied 
in competitive or imperfectly competitive markets. The induced effect is the impact of taxing 
other goods on the demand and the price of the good in question.  
Myles defines each price in the imperfectly competitive market as a function of the tax rate 
and the prices of other goods. Then, in the single consumer economy, the utility of the 
consumer is maximized with respect to the tax rates, so that the revenue collection objective 
of the government is fulfilled and the prices and profit functions are defined as explained 
above.  
The maximization problem yields tax rules resembling the Ramsey tax rule. However, the 
rule for competitive market goods now includes a term that captures the induced effects of a 
tax change on profits and prices of other goods. For imperfectly competitive markets, the 
variation in the degree of forward shifting also affects the optimal tax rate. Naturally, two 
goods only differing in the degree of forward shifting of taxes should be taxed so that the one 
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whose price is more responsive to tax change is subject to a lower rate. This also recurs when 
optimal tax rule is generalized for a many-consumer economy.  
Myles’ work stresses the importance of considering the whole series of actions following a 
tax change. The assumptions of perfect competition, present in the earlier studies in the field, 
are fairly restrictive, and Myles is the first to provide a general equilibrium framework for 
imperfectly competitive markets. Myles also brings the question of tax incidence to the scope 
of the debate on optimal commodity tax system. In the earlier studies, the perfect competition 
assumption implies complete pass-through of taxes.  
4.5. General remarks on optimal commodity taxation 
The preceding theories present tax rules for defining the optimal tax rates for commodities. In 
all these systems, the optimal tax rates are differentiated. In practice, such a differentiated 
system also has certain drawbacks. First, setting a tax rate for each good based on its demand 
characteristics would require an enormous proportion of information. Given the product 
variety of the modern economies, gathering such information would be extremely costly, if 
not impossible. Second, differentiated tax structure contradicts horizontal equality. The 
choices between goods are distorted, and otherwise similar consumers are punished or 
rewarded based on the types of goods they consume. Third, the administrative and 
compliance costs for maintaining a differentiated system are substantial (Tuomala 2009, 
Mirrlees et al 2011, Copenhagen Economics 2007). Differing tax treatment of goods is a 
source of legal conflicts in cases where the classification of the good in a certain commodity 
group is not straightforward. Additionally, it makes the tax policy susceptible to lobbying 
(Mirrlees et al 2011, Chapter 6). These reasons, among others, have led eminent quarters, 
such as Mirrlees et al (2011), consisting of top-rated economists, to prefer the use of uniform 
rates with certain well-defined exceptions
3
. The Finnish tax committee, set up by the Ministry 
of Finance, also recommended moving towards a more harmonized VAT system (Ministry of 
Finance 2010b). As Mirrlees Review puts it, “There are some quite subtle and theoretical 
arguments here, but, in general, the case for differentiated rates looks weak and that for a 
broader, more uniform, structure looks strong” (Mirrlees et al 2011, Chapter 6, pp.6).  
Even when there are gains to achieve from a differentiated system, it is not settled whether 
these gains outweigh above-mentioned costs. In most societies, a well-developed social 
security system and direct taxation may be better instruments for e.g. distributing income. As 
                                                     
3
 These include tax exemption on childcare (Mirrlees Review, Chapter 6, pp.15) and environmental and sin taxes. 
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the pure efficiency-based Ramsey result demonstrated, efficiency and equity aspects are often 
contradictory in commodity taxation. Thus, a commodity tax system which balances between 
these two requirements may be a less effective means of carrying out the egalitarian 
objectives than direct income payments would be. This emphasizes the necessity to design 
these two as an ensemble. 
Also, consumption taxation fails, when the tax changes, targeted to achieving economic or 
social gains, are not remitted to demand or consumer prices. Empirical research on tax 
incidence provides essential information on the effects of tax changes and is the subject of the 
next Chapter.   
5. Research on tax incidence 
 
The empirical evidence to back up the theories on tax incidence is growing, but still sparse, 
and the results remain mixed. Full pass-through as well as over- and under-shifting have been 
found by researchers, applying varying methods for deriving the causal estimates of the price 
and demand effects of the tax reforms. In this chapter, the above theory is complemented with 
a review of empirical contributions to this understudied field of public economics. The 
research in the international scale is first summarized, followed by an overview of the studies 
carried out in the Finnish context. The second part of the chapter discusses the results. 
5.1. Overview of the previous research 
Complete pass-through of taxes to consumer price was found by Poterba (1996) and later, 
applying different research methods, by Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2009). Being one of the 
earliest recognized studies on the subject, Poterba (1996) studied sales tax incidence with two 
large data sets from the U.S. The primary data set is a city-specific consumer price index data 
for men’s and women’s clothes and personal care items from 1947-1977. Another dataset is 
constructed for the Depression period of 1925-1939, consisting of less accurate half-yearly 
price index data for a commodity group defined broadly as “clothing”. The national price 
level over the period is used as a control proxy for cost development.  
The point estimates for the period of 1947-1977 indicate overshifting for women’s clothing 
and personal care items; however, null hypothesis of one-for-one pass-through of tax cannot 
still be rejected. For the Depression period, undershifting of taxes is found; the point estimate 
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for the pass-through is 0,62, reflecting less-than-complete shifting of taxes to prices. Here, the 
null hypothesis of full pass-through is rejected.  
Alm et al’s paper from 2009 studies the excise taxes on gasoline using a monthly panel data 
set from 50 U.S states in the period of 1984-1999, acquired from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Alm et al study not only tax incidence, but also the asymmetry of price 
responses to tax changes in different directions and the level of pass-through under different 
intensities of competition. They also estimate how rapidly prices adjust to the tax changes.  
Using within-group estimation model including fixed state and time effects, Alm et al find 
complete or nearly complete (99 %) shifting of taxes to consumer prices. Spatial analysis 
reveals that especially urban, more competitive states exhibit patterns of complete pass-
through, whereas in rural states slight undershifting may occur. The coefficient for the lagged 
tax rate is insignificant; thus, the price responses seem to occur within one month of tax 
change. The responses are found homogenous to whether the tax is increased or decreased. 
In the contrast to studies by Poterba (1996) and Alm et al (2009), Besley and Rosen (1999) 
and Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) find different-than-complete tax forward shifting in 
their studies. Besley and Rosen (1999) examine the incidence of sales taxes with U.S. data set 
from 1982 to 1990. They explain prices of selected, well-specified commodities with the 
variation in tax rates, controlling for costs and time effects. The panel data consists of 
quarterly dataset over eight years and 155 U.S. cities for 12 goods.  
The estimates on the degree of forward shifting differ between commodities. More than half 
of the twelve goods exhibit price changes exceeding the size of the tax change. For the rest, 
one-per-one increase in prices cannot be rejected. The level of overshifting is notably high; 5 
of the 12 goods studied actually exhibit a pass-through of more than 200 %. The findings are 
essentially confirmed by an alternative specification with lags. Correspondingly to Alm et al, 
Besley and Rosen find the price responses occurring shortly after the tax changes; within the 
scale of 0,3 - 1,3 quarters.  
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) examine pass-through of sales taxes on gasoline by 
comparing daily price development in Illinois and Indiana to that of their neighboring states in 
the same period, applying the difference-in-differences method. In Illinois and Indiana, the 
sales tax was first suspended and, after a period of 120 days in Indiana and 6 months in 
Illinois, raised back to its original level. As legislation in both states regulates the maximum 
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length of the tax suspensions, the changes in taxes were known by the market parties to be 
temporary. The researchers observe daily prices in gas stations in Illinois and Indiana and five 
neighboring states. They control for wholesale prices and neighborhood characteristics, such 
as median household income, age and race, in the analysis. Also the number of gas stations in 
a particular area is observed to provide a measure of local competition. 
The researchers find undershifting in the context of tax suspensions. The observed cut in retail 
prices is about 70 percent, after controlling for changes in wholesale prices and demographic 
characteristics of the neighborhood. The full shifting to prices is rejected. The reinstatements, 
for their sake, are followed by 80-100 percent pass-through. In contrast to the findings by 
Alm et al, these point estimates might reflect asymmetric reactions to tax changes; i.e. the 
dependence of the price responses on whether the tax rate is increased or decreased. However, 
equality of responses cannot be statistically rejected. Areas with lower brand concentration 
exhibit lower pass-through rates; this corresponds to the findings of Alm et al regarding the 
slightly smaller pass-through rates in the rural areas. However, a word of caution is necessary 
here; as the tax suspensions were known to be temporary, the results cannot be generalized to 
apply in a situation of permanent tax reform without discretion.   
Empirical research on tax incidence in Finnish context consists of only a few research papers, 
among them studies on VAT reduction on groceries by Peltoniemi & Varjonen (2010) and on 
hairdressing and small repair services by Kosonen (2010). Peltoniemi & Varjonen (2010) 
examined a VAT reform on groceries, executed in Finland starting from October 2009. The 
VAT was decreased by 5 percentage points from 17 % to 12 %, decreasing the traditionally 
high Finnish price level on groceries being the objective of the tax change. The research 
studies the effects of the tax reduction on prices in a mid-length period. The prices from well-
specified 171 groceries and 22 non-food products are collected 7 times during a two years 
period from supermarkets and grocery stores across Finland. The changes in transport and 
heating costs are considered by observing the variation in prices for a set of non-food 
products. 
While full-shifting of the tax change would imply a 4,3 percent price reduction, the 
researchers find a 5,7 percent decrease in grocery prices as a result of the reform when 
vegetables are included and a 5,2 percent decrease when left out. The change is calculated 
over one month’s period over the reform in October 2010. The decrease translates into a 133 
percent pass-through of the tax change with vegetables and to one of 121 percent without. The 
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variance regarding the inclusion of vegetables results from their seasonal price patterns, 
showing a decreasing price trend also in the international scale. No price changes on non-food 
products are found over the period of inspection; thus, the price change is not considered a 
consequence of changes in costs. The limited location-based analysis included in the study 
reveals heterogeneity of price changes, varying from 4,8 to 6,1 percent over space; the more 
sparsely populated areas representing the smallest pass-through rates.   
Kosonen (2010) studies tax incidence in the context of a tax reform from 2007 where value 
added tax on hairdressing was decreased by 14 percentage points. As the beauty salons, day 
spas and masseurs, representing similar trend behavior to hairdressers, were left out of the 
scope of the reform, the application of natural experiment design is facilitated. The data 
utilized consists of a 7-year monthly tax data set from the tax administrator and two types of 
survey price data. The monthly Consumer Price Index data covers in total 7 years before and 
after the reform. The Finnish Consumer Agency price data has observations from two periods, 
one before and one after the reform.  
The estimates derived from a difference-in-differences set-up indicate a pass-through of tax of 
around 60 percent, being significantly different from full pass-through. Responses across firm 
types are found heterogeneous, corporations exhibiting the largest pass-through rates and sole 
proprietors and partnerships adjusting their prices the least. Almost half of the firms are found 
not adjusting their prices downwards even slightly as a response to the tax reduction. For the 
firms that lowered their prices, a price change equal to the tax reduction is not typical; only 
slightly over 10 percent of the firms indicated a pass-through of more than 71 percent.   
In addition to the price effects, Kosonen studies the demand effects of the tax reduction. A 
slight decrease in firm turnover is found following the reform; this reduction, however, also 
includes the direct effect of possible price reduction on turnover. The instrumented turnover 
estimation, clearing the results from the direct effect of the price reduction on turnover, yields 
no significant estimates for price changes’ effect on turnover. The lack of demand effects is 
supported by the stable input demand by the hairdressers across the period of inspection; 
regarding this, it is not very likely that output increased either. No evidence of changes in the 
wage sum is found, suggesting that the level of employment remained unchanged also after 
the reform.  
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5.2. Discussion and shortcomings of the previous research 
The above studies derive varying conclusions on tax incidence. Undershifting is found by 
Doyle & Samphantharak (2008) and Kosonen (2010). Complete pass-through follows in the 
studies by Poterba (1996) and Alm et al (2009), and the results by Besley & Rosen (1999) and 
Peltoniemi & Varjonen (2010) suggest overshifting. 
The degree of forward-shifting in the studies seems to evolve according to the elasticity of 
demand. In the partial equilibrium model the pass-through rate was discovered inversely 
related to the elasticity of demand. The studies seem to confirm this pattern of higher pass-
through rates for goods with less elastic demand, suggested by the examination of the partial 
equilibrium framework. The tax reductions on gasoline, having inelastic demand, result 
generally in nearly complete pass through, as does the reform on groceries, with reported 
elasticity in Finland being 0,36 (Peltoniemi & Varjonen 2010). On the contrary, the more 
elastic hairdressing services exhibit less-than-perfect shifting of taxes.  
Several studies also found that the brand concentration or the differences in the level of local 
competition resulted in differences between studies. The areas with lower brand concentration 
were generally found to exhibit lower level of pass-through. Even though this might be 
evidence that the level of competition affects the incidence of taxes, the possibility of lower 
pass-through being a result of less elastic supply in these areas cannot be excluded. 
What might attribute to the differences in the pass-through results could also be the level of 
competition. The theories presented in Chapter 3 indeed suggest that, instead of full-shifting 
deterministically following from tax changes, the degree of forward-shifting of tax is 
dependent on the number of firms in the market, the marginal costs and the shape of the 
demand. Also, in the context of perfect competition relative inelasticity in supply might result 
in undershifting. Besley & Rosen (1999) argue that the overshifting found might result from 
the exercise of market power in retailing, and a reference is made to Delipalla and Keen (1992) 
to make sense of the results. The undershifting in gas stations, observed by Doyle & 
Samphantharak, might result from either imperfect competition or competitive markets with 
inelastic supply. The demand in the gasoline market being known as inelastic, the latter might 
provide a plausible interpretation. The observed overshifting by Peltoniemi & Varjonen could 
be caused by the high level of concentration in the Finnish grocery retail sector. However, 
some of the above-mentioned studies possess certain shortcomings. Thus, the observed 
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differences in results might follow from biases in estimation, resulting from other underlying 
price-affecting factors.  
The first problem, primarily present in the study of Poterba (1996), has to do with the 
specification of goods observed over a given period. The data of Poterba is very aggregated; 
the classification of goods is made under broad categories of ‘women’s clothing’, ‘men’s 
clothing’ and ‘personal care items’. A problem for causality arises from the use of broadly 
defined commodities; examining prices of more narrowly categorized items would facilitate a 
more accurate analysis. The further studies generally avoid this shortcoming using less 
aggregated micro data; the goods are homogenous over space and time, as gasoline, or the 
categories subject to inspection are well specified, such as ‘Big Mac’ by Besley & Rosen 
(1999) or ‘a haircut, 30 minutes’ by Kosonen (2010). This provides a solid basis for a ceteris 
paribus examination of the tax changes’ effects. As a result of a lot of noise in the research, 
the standard errors for point estimates are large in Poterba’s study, and thus it does not 
provide unambiguous results of the forward shifting of taxes. The point estimates are not to 
consider; if anything, this study might provide information of the direction of the change. 
The development towards more accurate data also concerns the frequency of observations. 
Whereas the studies by Poterba (1996) and Besley & Rosen (1999) handle quarterly data, the 
monthly data by Alm et al (2009) is likely to provide more exact estimates for example of the 
time of response of prices. The data of Kosonen (2010) consists for essential parts of monthly 
observations; Doyle & Samprahantak (2008) use daily data.  
Additionally, some of the above studies suffer from inadequate examination of policy 
endogeneity. The use of price indices for long time periods fails to shed light on the motives 
for the tax changes – the tax decreases may, for example, have been utilized as a tool for 
counter-cyclical policy, whereupon the identification of the source of the price change may 
not be clear. The policy reasons for the tax changes are not controlled for, thus leaving out the 
concern of industry-specific factors driving the tax changes. This aspect is not touched in the 
studies of Poterba (1996) and Alm et al (2009). In Besley & Rosen (1999), the issue of policy 
endogeneity is left unconsidered as well; on the run of six years studied, no evidence is 
provided that the tax changes are not endogeneous of conditions in the industry in question. 
As possibly not providing unbiased estimates, their results can be seen as not conclusive, but 
indicative, and to suggest evidence against the traditional view of the full pass-through of 
taxes.  
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As opposite to the above-mentioned studies, Doyle & Samphantharak’s study (2008) is the 
first to incorporate analysis on policy endogeneity issue. The populist policies of an election 
year are found as the principal motive behind the temporary tax suspensions in the two US 
states. In the paper by Kosonen (2010), policy endogeneity is also considered, and the 
experiment is found to be lacking industry-specific reasoning behind the tax reduction. 
The handling of costs appears problematic in multiple studies. For Poterba (1996), the 
national price index is used as a control for changes in general price level. However, industry-
specific price factors, such as material or employment costs or quality changes, are not 
accounted for. The study of Besley and Rosen (1999) also suffers from the lack of appropriate 
cost data. The proxies for production costs are price indices for chosen inputs; two-room 
apartment rent, the minimum charge for a laundry machine repairer and the price of one 
gallon of unleaded gasoline; and another choice of cost factors could thus have yielded 
deviating results. In contrast, the data of Alm et al (2009) is well comprehensive; the 
wholesale price is the dominant retail-price affecting cost factor in the gasoline retail market, 
but also other cost factors, like retail wage costs and a proxy for transport costs are included. 
Instead of trying to incorporate multiple price indices to control for cost changes, there is a 
trend towards less cumbersome techniques. The most recent research (Doyle & 
Samphantharak 2008, Kosonen 2010) takes advantage of natural experiments with proper 
methods; the difference-in-difference method with a valid control group saves the trouble of 
controlling for the wide-ranging unobserved cost factors with at times inaccurate proxies. The 
key underlying assumption of parallel trends between the treatment and the control groups 
seems fulfilled in the two studies mentioned. The lack of an appropriate control group is well 
demonstrated in Peltoniemi & Varjonen (2010): even though non-food product prices are used 
to control for the development of prices for some cost factors, it still does not succeed in 
capturing the natural seasonal fluctuation in food prices. Based on the downward price trend 
from the last few months preceding the reform, the researchers suspect that the food prices 
would have been decreasing anyway. If the counterfactual price trend continued being 
downward sloping, the estimates derived exaggerate the causal effect of the reform on prices.  
The lack of consensus and corresponding results on the area emphasizes the need for further 
research on the subject. In the next chapter, the VAT reduction on the restaurant services in 
Finland is studied.  
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6. Empirical analysis 
 
6.1. Background and hypotheses 
This thesis utilizes the Finnish tax reform on restaurant industry to estimate the tax incidence 
on labor-intensive services. The main estimate of interest is the average change in the 
consumer price of a restaurant meal. Heterogeneity of responses over restaurant type is also 
examined. To better reflect the consumer viewpoint, a weighted average of the price change is 
calculated, the weights being based on the sales of the restaurants. The sales serves as the 
proxy for the number of servings sold in each restaurant. The results are then reflected against 
the framework of theoretical models of tax incidence under different intensities of 
competition. Whether the estimates correspond to those derived in the earlier empirical work 
on tax incidence will also be discussed.  
As was noted in Chapter 3, the level of pass-through is related to the form of competition in 
the market. Monopolistic competition could be an appropriate model for describing the 
restaurant industry. Restaurants differ in non-price characteristics such as atmosphere, 
location, serving sizes and the quality of food. The products are substitutes, but not 
homogenous as in perfect competition. In the short run, firms in the monopolistically 
competitive market behave like monopolies. An individual firm can freely choose prices, 
without the need to engage in strategic competition. However, the entry in the market is easy, 
and in the long run, the competition is expected to tighten up within the product groups and 
the market structure to become more similar to that of perfect competition. As the 
consumption of the services is not very mobile across space, the competition is also local. The 
maturity of the local market is thus likely to define the amount of market power possessed by 
the restaurants.  
Among the restaurants operating in the monopolistically competitive markets, there are a 
handful of very large firms such Restel and S-group, the latter possessing a market share of 
19,3 % of the Finnish restaurant industry in 2010 (SOK Corporation Annual Report 2010). 
The lunch restaurant subsector is dominated by Amica, Sodexho, Palmia and Antell-Catering. 
These large corporations undoubtedly possess undetermined level of market power, and thus 
their behavior is expected differ from the behavior of their smaller counterparts. 
The main hypothesis here is that the tax change is reflected in lower consumer prices. A 
difference in pass-through rates is expected between a representative small restaurant and a 
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large chain restaurant, arising from differences in market power. The data includes an 
indicator of whether or not the restaurant belongs to MaRa, the labor market organization and 
lobbyist operating on the industry. Following the Parliament’s decision to decrease the VAT 
rate, MaRa decided to recommend full price reduction to its member restaurants (MaRa 2009). 
Thus these restaurants might also exhibit responses that differ from the average.  
Under- or complete shifting of tax was likely in the case of perfect competition. As the supply 
side of the market hardly is inelastic and the production capacity is likely to be adjusted quite 
easily, complete shifting would be the more plausible option in the context of restaurant 
services. Under- or overshifting is predicted under market power, depending on the demand 
characteristics and the number of firms. As the demand characteristics are unknown, 
hypotheses are not provided of the level of pass-through. Also, the public pressure might be 
reflected in pricing decisions of the large companies (Taloussanomat 2009a, Taloussanomat 
2010a, Helsingin Sanomat 2010 etc.). 
The effects on factor demand, considered in the general equilibrium model, are left outside 
the scope of this thesis as the main focus is in deriving estimates on the reform’s effect on 
consumer price. When evaluating the reform’s effect on the economy on the whole, these 
effects should be considered.  
The VAT rate was decreased from 22 to 13, and thus complete shifting of tax to prices would 
induce a price change of 7,4 percent, derived from 
           
     
              
This serves as a benchmark for calculating the degree of pass-through.  
6.2. Methodology 
For estimating the change in the consumer prices caused by the tax change, its effect must be 
distinguished from other price-affecting factors’ effect. An upward shift in input prices; food, 
for example; could cause restaurant prices to rise, and ignoring that effect would yield biased 
estimates of the causal effect of the reform. The counterfactual development of prices in the 
absence of the reform must be controlled for.  
The approach taken here differs e.g. from that of Poterba (1996) and Besley & Rosen (1999), 
who attempted to control for the price development by using proxies of different cost factors. 
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A less complicated and potentially more accurate way to proceed is to follow the practice by 
Doyle & Samphantharak (2009) and Kosonen (2010) and use the Difference-in-Differences 
(DID) method
4
. 
The DID method uses a control group that captures the counterfactual behavior of prices in 
the absence of the reform. The treatment group is the group subject to the measure of interest, 
in this case the tax reform. The method requires panel data. The aggregate-level differences 
between the groups are controlled in the model. When the control group is observed over time 
and the group-level differences subtracted away, the unobserved time effect, common for both 
the treatment and the control group, is captured.  
Denote the price in restaurant i belonging to group g at time t as 
Here,       group indicator; T = treatment group, C = control group 
    = group-specific price affecting factors, constant over time 
  = common time effect 
     = dummy; 1 = treatment group & treatment period
5
 
    = the causal effect of the treatment on price  
       = residual,  (         )    
 
For the control group, the expected change in prices between the time periods becomes  
 (    |                      )   (    |                       )     
                                                                                              (25)                                                     
       
, where                 , as           and E(                  . The 
expected difference in the treatment group between the time periods is  
                                                     
4
 The derivation of DID functions follows the representation of Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
5
 Here, the dummy refers to the restaurants subject to tax reform when the reform is in force.  
                        (24)  
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, because       now. The difference-in-differences between the groups is  
Thus, the causal effect can be estimated by calculating these differences between the groups’ 
means. The causal impact, or the average treatment effect, is the difference between the 
observed outcome and the counterfactual outcome in the absence of the treatment in the group 
subject to the program. 
The application of the difference-in-differences method does not demand similarity between 
the groups in all other dimensions than tax policy.   term is used to control for the aggregate 
level unobserved differences between groups, when these differences remain constant over 
time. In this sense, DID method acts like the fixed effects estimation (explained in more depth 
in Section 6.2.3), but at a more aggregate level. The key identifying assumption is, however, 
that without the treatment the groups indeed would behave in a similar manner – i.e., that the 
trends between the groups are similar, and  
Then, the treatment is a deviation from this trend. Exhibit 2 illustrates the situation 
graphically.  
  (    |           )   (    |            )
          
(26) 
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6.2.1. Selection of the control groups 
The treatment group consists of Finnish restaurants serving food and non-alcoholic beverages. 
For utilizing the DID method, a valid control group is needed, a similar time trend between 
the groups being the requisite. Thus, the control group should share the same time-varying 
characteristics as the treatment group. The ideal experiment would randomize the tax 
reduction between Finnish locations, making a natural division into control and treatment 
groups. While this consideration obviously is hypothetical, it provides a benchmark for 
defining the nearest equivalent for the control group.   
The factors that affect the development in Finnish restaurant prices include variation in 
general price level and in particular input prices, the costs of labor and food. Of those, food 
prices are indirectly affected by the transportation costs. The holiday season is a cause for 
demand shocks; in lunch restaurants, a negative demand shock may occur, whereas having 
other meals in a restaurant may be complementary to leisure and thus occur increasingly 
during the holidays. Given these facts, the restaurants in such a neighboring country that 
experiences no tax reform and experiences the same holiday season provide a well-grounded 
choice for a comparison group. Here, Estonian restaurant prices are used.  
As similar price trends were the prequisition for the use of the method, differences in the past 
inflation rates may contradict the choice made. Historically, the price development in the 
Finnish and Estonian restaurants has not been quite similar, as is shown in Exhibit 3. Price 
development in Sweden corresponds more with that of Finland. However, the availability of 
Exhibit 2. The DID set-up. 
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data defined the choice here; Estonian restaurants provided the nearest equivalent with the 
data available.  
 
Sources: Statistics Estonia (2011), Statistics Finland (2011), Statistics Sweden (2011). 
Regardless of the long-term dissimilarity between the prices, parallel development is expected 
over the period of observation because of the short duration of the period and the above-
mentioned seasonality reasons. In addition, the effects of the potentially diverging time trends 
are discussed in Chapter 8. 
The Estonian data contains a large number of observations, and is thus fit for deriving 
significant estimates. Other control groups are used to contrast the results derived from the 
Estonian primary control group. Similarity between estimates from the use of different control 
groups would provide support for the primary results derived. Our data set allowed for the 
examination of the price change against Finnish hotel prices. The group shares the same 
seasonal pattern with the restaurant services sprung from tourism. The design of the tax 
reform also offers a natural control group, as alcoholic beverages are not subject to tax 
reduction. These prices are also included in the data set. The number of the observations is too 
small for deriving reliable regression estimates; however, they are used as a reference when 
describing the price change in the treatment group.  
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Exhibit 3. Restaurant and hotel price indices for Finland, Estonia and Sweden. 
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6.2.2. Basic regression DID model6 
As described in subsection 6.2.1., there will be three control groups used. The primary control 
group is Estonian restaurants.  The primary method used for modeling the price in restaurant i 
in group g at time t (groups being Finnish and Estonian restaurants) is a difference-in 
differences with OLS estimation 
where                      = the logarithm of the average price in 
restaurant i in group g at time t 
         = dummy; 1 = Finland, 0 = Estonia 
   = time dummy; 1 = after the reform 
             = dummy for treatment;1 = (Finland =1 & after = 1)
7
 
      = group- and restaurant-level characteristics 
    = residual for restaurant i in group g at time t  
Data were collected from various servings in each restaurant to examine whether price 
changes were symmetric across different portions (explained in more depth in Section 6.4).To 
capture the average price effect in each restaurant, the mean of different servings is calculated 
and used as a dependent variable. Taking a logarithm from the prices of varying scale in 
absolute numbers removes the bias resulting from very large prices in the sample. Using a 
semi-logarithmic form allows for straightforward interpretation of result; now, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as an approximation of the percentage changes in prices 
resulting from the explanatory variable. 
Coefficient of the treatment group and period interaction dummy,  , is the causal effect of 
interest. Recall from Section 6.2 that it measures  
  
                                                     
6
 Follows the representation of Angrist & Pischke (2009). 
7
 Corresponds to    in Equation 24. 
                                        (           )  
             
(29) 
42 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Regression DID model with fixed effects 
To derive more accurate estimates, a fixed effects model is put to use. The DID estimation 
controlled for the aggregate level differences between the control and the treatment group. 
The fixed effects estimation takes into account the individual-level unobserved differences 
across restaurants. The method can be used when there are observations from two or more 
time periods for each individual. The key underlying assumption here also requires that 
unobserved characteristics stay constant over time. The sample used is a heterogeneous group 
of restaurants with price-affecting unobserved characteristics such as managerial ability and 
location. Thus, the model is also applicable in our study. (Angrist & Pischke 2009.) Because 
fixed effects estimation allows correlation between the unobserved factors and the 
explanatory variables, fixed effects model is preferred to random effects (Wooldridge 2003). 
The case of such correlation cannot be excluded. 
The fixed effects method can be interpreted as adding a dummy for each restaurant and thus 
calculating a specific coefficient for all of them in the regression. The dummy’s coefficient 
then captures the effect of all unobserved individual-specific factors that are constant in time. 
The setting is equivalent to giving an individual intercept for each restaurant in the regression 
model. The statistical software packages used for running a fixed-effects regression often 
exploit some simplifications that are similar to the above-mentioned specification. The 
techniques include calculating differences from means, a method that corresponds 
algebraically to adding individual dummies. As for two time periods, there is no difference 
between time-demeaning; i.e. calculating differences from mean, and taking first differences 
over time, either. The programs also adjust the standard errors for the right degree of freedom 
after calculating the additional means. (Stock & Watson 2007.) 
The fixed effects regression model becomes 
Note here that    appears with the individual subscript i.    is specific to each restaurant; it 
includes the intercept common to the whole sample and the individual intercept, i.e. the 
   [ (    |                 )   (    |                  )]  
[ (    |                 )   (    |                  )]   
(30) 
                                         (           )  
             
 (31) 
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dummy and the dummy coefficient for the individual. The individual averages for the time-
demeaning technique become 
and the subtraction yields 
As demonstrated above, using time-demeaning estimation removes the time-invariant 
variables, including the group effects, in the estimation. This holds also for first-difference 
approach. Thus, all explanatory variables used must change over time. Although some 
information is lost there, the use of the method facilitates consistent estimates of the effect of 
interest. In the differences-of-means technique, the standard errors are potentially serially 
correlated. (Angrist & Pischke 2009.) With two time periods, the distance from mean is equal 
for both observations on individual. The serial correlation is thus removed in the within 
estimation, and the use of clustered standard errors is not necessary in our case. Robust 
standard errors, consistent with error term heteroskedasticity, will, however, be used. 
6.3. Causality considerations 
The above-described methods all aim to provide consistent estimates on the causal effect of 
the tax reform on the restaurant prices. There are, however, three factors that need special 
consideration when the causal relationship between the price change and the tax reduction is 
examined. Broadly speaking, causality refers to the phenomenon of an action directly causing 
an outcome. Stock &Watson (2007, pp. 9) define causal effect as “the effect on an outcome of 
a given action or treatment, as measured in an ideal randomized controlled experiment”. 
6.3.1. Anticipation 
The law change was announced half a year before it was actually enforced (FINLEX 2009a). 
If the restaurants had anticipated the tax reduction by raising the prices preceding the reform 
and decreased them after, the short-term price effect would differ from that of long-term. The 
issue was considered by Harju and Kosonen (2010). The inspection of Finnish restaurant price 
                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                  ̅   (          ̅)  
   ̅     ̅   
   (32) 
                                         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅          ̅  
             ̅      
 
   
   ̅            ̅    
(33) 
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index against the Swedish one shows no signs of anticipation effects for the six months period 
preceding the tax reform. Thus, there seems to be no anticipation effects to bias the estimates. 
6.3.2. Policy endogeneity 
When exploiting variation in policies in the design of empirical experiments, the intentions 
behind policy-making must be considered. If the policies are enacted as a response to an 
industry’s economic or political conditions e.g. as expansionary measures, biased estimates on 
the policy’s causal effect may arise.  
The issue of policy endogeneity in the context of this study was considered earlier in Section 
2.3. The timing of the law change was largely affected by the Union level legislation, and 
there were public demands for lowering the VAT rate for restaurants to the level of food sold 
in grocery stores. Thus, the law change is unlikely to have been carried out due to the 
conditions specific to Finnish restaurant industry. 
6.3.3. Demand effects 
Also a change in consumption, e.g. increasing demand just after the tax reduction, could bias 
the estimates of the tax incidence.  An upward shift in demand as a consequence of tax 
reduction would create upward pressure in prices, and ignoring the effect would result in 
smaller-than-actual estimates on price change. The turnover of the company would, 
controlling for other factors, provide an estimate of changes in demand. However, demand 
effects will be left outside the scope of this thesis. Because the period of data collection only 
continues one and a half months after the beginning of the reform, we assume here that the 
possible demand effects are not yet reflected in prices.   
6.4. Data description 
The analysis is performed with a micro-level panel dataset collected during the summer 2010 
for the Government Institute for Economic Research. The sample restaurants were randomly 
chosen from the official business information system. Randomization is a necessary condition 
for a representative sample of the whole restaurant industry in Estonia and Finland. The 
restaurants selected in the sample were followed before and after the tax reform of July 2010. 
Each restaurant was observed twice; data was recorded on restaurant prices and the 
characteristics of the restaurant. At the first round of data collection, the serving name was 
recorded. Thus, prices for these specified servings could be recorded also on the second price 
collection round. The primary method of data collection was internet collection. If the prices 
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could not be found on the web sites or no existing web sites were found, the restaurant was 
contacted by phone. For each restaurant, data were collected for various servings under 
different categories, such as lunch, a vegetarian meal, non-alcoholic beverage or an appetizer 
(see Table 3 for variable description). Information on restaurant characteristics was also 
recorded.  
The sample includes 1357 restaurants in total, of those 958 being Finnish and 399 Estonian. 
In addition, data on 274 hotels are included. The composition of groups stayed essentially the 
same across time; attrition was small, with only 26 restaurants dropping out of the sample in 
the second round of price collection. As this accounts for only 2 percent of the total number of 
restaurants, attrition is not considered a problem in the research.      
Most of the analyses are made using a logarithmic combined price variable. The variable is a 
combination of seven prices that represent different serving categories: meal1, meal2, 
vegetarian meal, pizza, appetizer, dessert and lunch. The use of combination price reflects the 
size of average price change over the whole variety of servings; if the restaurant keepers 
would differentiate the price change across different meal categories, only assessing a price 
change on one meal type would give a biased result of the average effect of the tax reform on 
the price level. The logarithmic convertion is used to calculate the relative changes in prices.  
In the raw data set, Estonian prices were announced in Estonian kroons, the currency of the 
nation at the time. The kroon’s rate was fixed at EUR 1 = EEK 15.6466 since 2004 (European 
Central Bank 2004), and this rate is used in converting Estonian restaurant prices to 
correspond with the euro ones.  
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample restaurants. The observations from 
Finland outnumber those from Estonia. Tax_22 is tax data for the taxes paid by the Finnish 
sample restaurants, and it is later used as a proxy for the relative sales of the restaurants. 
Table 1 also demonstrates that most of the data was collected from the restaurants’ web sites. 
Roughly 25 percent of the sample restaurants were contacted by phone and 2,6 percent were 
paid a visit. Table 2 represents the restaurant characteristics by country. The proportion of 
MaRa member restaurants is naturally zero in Estonia; in the Finnish sample, they present a 
share of 33,5 %. In Finland, S-group restaurants are well represented in the sample, being a 
portion of nearly 14 percent.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of the restaurants over the whole sample. 
Variable  Description n Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
MaRa 
dummy; 1 = Belongs to the Finnish 
Hospitality Association 
2772 0.238 0.426 0 1 
Chain restaurant dummy; 1 = Chain restaurant.  2622 0.275 0.447 0 1 
S-ryhmä dummy; 1 = Belongs to S-group 1634 0.069 0.253 0 1 
Tax_22 
taxes paid at the rate of 22%, 
information available only for Finnish 
restaurants 
2106 402 057 1 665 435 -85.58 14 500 000 
Method of price 
collection 
0 = internet; 1 = phone call; 2 = visit 2643 0.305 0.514  0 2 
 
Internet 1906 72.10 % 
   
 
Phone call 668 25.30 % 
   
  Visit 69 2.60 %       
Country "Finland" / "Estonia" 
     
 
Finland 1859 70.30 % 
   
  Estonia 787 29.70 %       
 
Table 2. Restaurant characteristics by country. 
Restaurant classification Estonia (%) Finland (%)  
Fast food restaurant 12 32.1 
A la carte 49.6 33.6 
Café 20.6 14.5 
Lunch restaurant 17.7 19.7 
Total 100 % 100 % 
n 800 1,895 
S-group     
Belongs to S-group 0 13.8 
Other 100 86.2 
Total 100 % 100 % 
n 800 871 
MaRa restaurants     
MaRa restaurant 0 33.5 
Other 100 66.5 
Total 100 % 100 % 
n 800 1972 
Chain restaurants     
Chain 15.3 32.8 
Other 84.7 67.2 
Total 100 % 100 % 
n 784 1838 
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The composition of the restaurant industry differs between Estonia and Finland. Fast food and 
chain restaurants appear in a much higher proportion in Finland. Cafes and a la carte 
restaurants are more often found in Estonian restaurant industry. The classifications of 
restaurant type are suggestive and are likely to depend on the data collector (for the 
classification by restaurant type, see Appendix 6).  
Table 3 summarizes and describes the price variables used. Combined price is the row mean 
for the seven price variables; the average change in the restaurant price level can be calculated 
as the difference in the combined price variable between two time periods for each restaurant.  
In Exhibit 4, the distributions of Finnish and Estonian prices are represented before and after 
the tax reform. The distributions are of same shape; in both groups, the distribution is skewed 
to the right, and excess kurtosis is observed. Thus, the majority of prices are small, while the 
long right tail represents relatively few, large values. The prices in the Finnish restaurants are 
generally higher, and the longer right tail indicates that there are more restaurants with high 
price level relative to the bulk of the values. Not surprisingly, the normality tests strictly reject 
the null hypothesis of no kurtosis or skewness. The tests confirm higher kurtosis in the 
Finnish data; the Finnish price distribution is also found more skewed than the Estonian one.  
The logarithmic transformations smooth the distributions. The distributions are still not 
normal, but the distributions follow more closely the QQ-plot of a normal distribution. 
Additionally, skewness is no longer found for the Finnish price distribution.     
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Table 3. Variable description over the whole sample. 
Variable  Description n Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max 
Meal1 
price for a popular meal; a beef, a sushi 
assortment, kebab with fries, Big Mac etc. 
depending on the restaurant type 
2268 9.79 6.93 0.29 55 
Meal2  
price for a popular meal; chicken, fish etc. 
depending on the restaurant type 
1710 8.98 5.86 0.24 59 
Vegetarian meal 
price for a vegetarian meal or a less popular 
meal 
1602 6.94 4.68 0.32 65 
Pizza price for a pizza 578 7.85 2.87 0.45 15 
Appetizer price for an appetizer 1144 4.91 2.76 0.32 20.45 
Dessert price for a dessert 998 3.02 2.17 0.32 19.17 
Non-alcoholic 
beverage 
price for a soft drink or another non-alcoholic 
beverage 
960 1.83 0.78 0.38 6.35 
Lunch price for lunch 1180 7.00 3.27 0.89 29 
Lunch soup price for lunch soup 320 4.69 2.18 0.89 12.5 
Beer price for a beer 712 3.16 1.26 0.89 6.2 
Wine 
price for house wine; a glass of 12cl, or if not 
found, a bottle 
454 6.29 9.37 1 90 
Coffee price for a cup of coffee 234 1.27 0.49 0.26 3 
Latte 
price for a special coffee; a latte, cappuccino 
etc. 
144 2.03 0.79 0.64 4.2 
Combined price 
a mean of seven variables; Meal1, Meal2, 
Vegetarian meal, Pizza, Appetizer, Dessert 
and Lunch; calculated by restaurants and time 
period 
2458 7.47 4.37 0.32 44.13 
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Exhibit 4. The distribution of combined consumer price by period and country. 
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7. Results 
 
The representation of the results begins with a mostly visual overview of the price change. 
The Finnish price development is compared to that of Estonia. The alternative control groups 
are then used to contrast the results. The price change is examined over meal categories and in 
different subgroups; the chain restaurants, members of the Finnish Hospitality Association 
MaRa and the S-group restaurants are inspected with particular care.  
The rest of the chapter is devoted to the regression results. A difference-in-differences 
estimation is first run with a simple OLS model without and with control variables. The fixed 
effects estimation is then used to derive more precise regression coefficients. Last, a weighted 
average of the price change is estimated, using the sales of the company as a proxy for the 
number of servings sold. 
7.1. Description of the price change 
For estimating the relative change in prices, i.e. the change in percentages, the price data is 
converted to natural logarithm form. For small changes, the difference in logs approximates 
the percentage change of a variable. It is important to note that the price changes presented 
here are still not estimates of the causal effect of the reform, as they have not been controlled 
for the counterfactual price development. 
Exhibit 5 shows the distribution of the logarithmic combined price change in Finland and 
Estonia. The vertical dashed line stands for the benchmark value of -7,4%, the amount of full 
pass-through of tax. The distribution for Finnish prices has two peaks; one at the full pass-
through ad another at no price effect. The Finnish restaurants thus show an ambivalent 
reaction pattern to the tax reform: most restaurants have either passed the tax fully to the 
prices, or not reacted to the tax change at all. Appendix 8 shows the distribution of the price 
change for each meal category. The pattern present in Exhibit 5 with two high-frequency 
points seems to recur across meal categories. Only dessert and appetizer categories show 
diverging behavior; no peak is observed at the point of full pass-through.  
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When comparing the distributions of the Finnish price change and the price change in the 
control group, the control group shows nearly no variation in prices. The shape of the Finnish 
price change distribution seems to be driven by the tax change, not other price-affecting 
factors. The observation is supported whether the Finnish change is contrasted against 
Estonian prices or the alternative control groups, prices for alcoholic drinks and hotel prices 
(Exhibit 6, Appendix 9). The distribution of the price change in the three control groups is of 
similar shape, with the highest frequency at zero change benchmark. The range of the price 
change, however, varies. Detailed numbers of the price change in Finnish and Estonian 
restaurants is provided in Appendix 7. Exhibit 7 shows a visual representation of the price 
change in different meal and drink categories. Note that wine and beer were not subject to tax 
reduction, as alcoholic beverages were excluded from the scope of the reform.  
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Exhibit 6. Consumer price change against Finnish hotels. 
 
Exhibit 7. Consumer price change in different meal categories. 
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The rest of the section will focus on analyzing how the price change was divided between 
Finnish restaurants. Exhibit 8 shows the price change in chain restaurants versus other 
restaurants. Chain restaurants are of particular interest, as they differ from the sole restaurants 
in the degree of market power. There are small and large chains under the category, and thus 
the level of market power among the subgroup varies substantially. Thus, a straightforward 
analysis of the effects of the market power cannot be carried out on this basis. 
 
Exhibit 8. Consumer price change in chain restaurants. 
 
 
The chain restaurants certainly differ from the stand-alone restaurants in their price 
adjustment behavior. Whereas the point of highest frequency in the change distribution is zero 
for stand-alone restaurants, chain restaurants exhibit a higher tendency to reduce prices for the 
size of the tax than not to change prices at all. This might suggest that the average price 
change is largely driven by the chain restaurants.  
The level of organization of a restaurant could also affect its response to the reform. The 
association for the Finnish restaurant keepers is MaRa, the Finnish Hospitality Association. 
The reform was lobbied by MaRa, and it campaigned for a price reduction in its member 
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restaurants before the tax reform (Nuutinen 2010). The reactions in these restaurants are also 
of particular interest because MaRa member restaurants cover 20-25 percent of the industry in 
the number of restaurants and 80-90 percent in the share of sales (Nuutinen 2010). The MaRa 
restaurants are graphed against non-MaRa restaurants in Exhibit 9. The graph illustrates that 
the changes are heterogeneous between MaRa and non-MaRa restaurants. The MaRa 
restaurants were more likely to reduce the price level by the size of the tax reduction. Also, 
this behavior seems to be more probable in the group than leaving the prices unchanged. This 
also suggests that as the majority of the sales in the industry is generated by MaRa restaurants, 
the price change observed by the consumers is likely to be larger than the change calculated 
as the average based on the number of restaurants. 
 
Exhibit 9. Consumer price change in Mara and non-Mara restaurants. 
 
 
For analysis of the amount of the price change in the Finnish restaurants, the price change is 
divided into different categories based on whether price increased, stayed the same or 
decreased. Additionally, price reduction is divided into three categories based on whether the 
price decreased less, equal to or more than the amount of tax. Table 4 below shows the 
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price change is then inspected in particular over chain and S-group restaurants and different 
restaurant types. 
The table delivers essentially the same message as the graphs above did.  The inspection of 
the price change by restaurant type shows that the price change was most likely to be equal to 
the tax change in lunch restaurants. For all other restaurant types, more than half of the 
restaurants are classified in the ‘No effect’ category. The peculiarity that 7 percent of the 
cafes seem to have decreased prices by more than the amount of tax is due to the small sample 
size of those restaurants, individual observations thus standing out. From S-group restaurants, 
an impressive majority of 80 percent of the group’s restaurants have reduced prices by the 
amount of tax.  
The ‘Reduction equal to the tax change’ category includes the price changes within one 
percentage point scale in both directions. A stricter definition of equality (from -7 to -7,8 
percent)  reveals that 140 of the sample restaurants decreased prices exactly by the amount of 
the tax. The price change that this accurately corresponds to the size of tax reduction might be 
rather a result from strategic behavior than a consequence of new market equilibrium.  
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Table 4. The density by the amount of the price changes. 
  The change in the consumer price by category 
  
Price 
increase 
No effect 
Reduction 
below tax 
change 
Reduction 
equal to tax 
change 
Reduction 
above tax 
change 
Total 
Country             
Estonia 4.9 % 91.4 % 2.6 % 0 % 1 % 100 % 
Finland 5.8 % 52.9 % 18.5 % 19.8 % 3.1 % 100 % 
All  5.5 % 64.9 % 13.5 % 13.6 % 2.4 % 100 % 
N 68 798 166 167 30 1,229  
Finland             
Chain restaurant 
      
Chain restaurant 3.1 % 20.3 % 26.2 % 46.2 % 4.2 % 100 % 
Other 7.3 % 70.1 % 14.3 % 5.8 % 2.5 % 100 % 
All 5.9 % 53 % 18.4 % 19.6 % 3.1 % 100 % 
N 49 444 154 164 26 837 
By restaurant type              
Fast food 8.1 % 56.8 % 18.2 % 13.7 % 3.2 % 100 % 
A la carte 6 % 54.2 % 17.3 % 19.9 % 2.7 % 100 % 
Cafe 6 % 57.1 % 13.1 % 16.7 % 7.1 % 100 % 
Lunch restaurant 1.7 % 42.3 % 23.4 % 30.9 % 1.7 % 100 % 
All 5.8 % 52.9 % 18.5 % 19.8 % 3.1 % 100 % 
N 49 447 156 167 26 845 
S-group             
Belongs to S-group 1.8 % 3.6 % 14.5 % 80 % 0 % 100 % 
Other 6.1 % 53.9 % 20.9 % 15.1 % 4.1 % 100 % 
All 5.5 % 47 % 20 % 24 % 3.5 % 100 % 
N 22 188 80 96 14 400 
 
7.2. Analysis of the average price effect 
As noted in the beginning of the preceding section, the price change does still not necessarily 
account for the causal effect of the tax reduction on prices. To estimate the causal price 
responses to the reform, the regressions here take advantage of the methods described in 
Section 6.2. First, the average change for a representative restaurant is derived. Then, the 
sales-weighted regression is run to reflect the average price change from the consumer 
perspective.  
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with no weights derives the causal effect of the 
price change for a representative restaurant. OLS does not take into account whether the 
restaurants have large or small numbers of customers. The estimator is simply derived as a 
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result from the minimization of the squared prediction error, i.e. squared residuals, and for a 
large number of observations it approaches the population average. As the sample in question 
is a random sample of the registered Finnish restaurants, the average is simply based on the 
number of firms. The matter is emphasized here to provide a basis for understanding the 
weighted regression in the section 7.3. 
7.2.1. Simple DID model 
Recall from Subsection 6.2.2 that the regression is of form 
, where   
  is the vector of possible control variables used. The regression is first run without 
control variables. Then, dummies for S-group, MaRa and chain restaurants are included. The 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of constant variance, and 
thus heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used to correct the standard errors. 
The regression results are exhibited in Table 5. The first column shows the regression results 
for the DID OLS regression. Note that the estimate of interest,  , is the coefficient for DD. 
The estimate gives a value of -0.023, which in a semi-logarithmic regression corresponds to a 
-2,3 percent change in the prices and thus a 31 percent pass-through rate of the tax reduction. 
This is the effect on price resulting from belonging to the treatment group at the time of the 
treatment. However, the estimates suffer from large standard errors, and the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The only estimate with significance is  , the coefficient for belonging 
to the treatment group. It indicates that prices in restaurants in Finland are 72 percent higher 
than in Estonia.  
Column 2 reports the regression results when the model is controlled with MaRa, S-group and 
chain restaurant variables. Restaurants belonging to MaRa or S-group are likely to have 
higher price level than other restaurants, and belonging to a chain is likely to decrease prices. 
The downward effect of belonging to a chain on the price level might be driven by the many 
fast food restaurants and cafes operating within chains. Again, no significant estimates of the 
price change due to the tax reduction can be derived. Note here that the number of 
observations decreases from the first column. This is due to a lack of S-group indicator for a 
big number of observations. While the reason behind the missing indicators remains unclear, 
it does not challenge our analysis. Based on the examination of the restaurant characteristics, 
                                        (           )  
             
(29) 
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the selection of restaurants with missing information does not seem to follow a certain pattern, 
but seems to be rather arbitrary. Thus, the group still subject to the analysis is smaller but 
representative of the whole sample, and an unbiased analysis can be carried out.  
7.2.2. DID model with fixed effects 
DID OLS regression fails to derive significant coefficients, as there is a lot variation in the 
explained variable, the combination price; that is left unexplained by the model. An attempt to 
correct for this is made by using the fixed effects model. In the model, each restaurant is 
allowed its own intercept. Thus, the unobserved restaurant-specific factors are controlled for.  
Column 3 represents the results for the fixed effects estimation. The DD coefficient value 
implies a price reduction of 2,3 percent due to the tax change. This corresponds to a 31 
percent level of pass-through. The value of the coefficient is equal to its value in the first 
column; the estimates from the OLS regression are unbiased. This is natural as the fixed 
effects estimation only affects the individual intercepts. What is different, however, is the 
level of statistical significance. The DD coefficient is now significant at the 1 % level while 
the same estimate from the OLS estimation was not found statistically significant at all. This 
is due to the smaller standard errors resulting from the better explanatory power of the model. 
Note that the constant reported at the bottom of the column is the average of the fixed effects 
parameter (StataCorp. 2009, pp. 447). 
The value of R
2
, however, is in contrast with the claim of the better explanatory power. Stata 
utilizes the time-demeaning technique explained in subsection 6.2.3 in calculating the fixed-
effects estimates. Thus, no dummies are actually calculated, and within R
2
 is calculated from 
the mean-deviated regression. When it comes to the fixed effects parameters that are added in 
the model, the within R
2
 makes no attempt to measure their effect on the overall fit of the 
model (StataCorp. 2009, pp. 463). Thus, the overall R
2 
results in lower than in the OLS model. 
However, the F-statistics indicate joint significance of the estimates.  
Although the fixed effects model does not allow including time-invariant variables, those can 
be interacted with variables that change over time (Wooldridge 2009). Thus, while belonging 
to MaRa or being a part of a chain is not likely to change over the short period of inspection, 
interacting MaRa and chain indicators with the treatment group and –period term DD enables 
the estimation of the effects of the tax reform for these groups separately. The inspection of 
the graphs in the beginning of the section suggested that the effect of the reform in MaRa and 
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chain groups differs from the average change pattern. Column 4 reports the regression results 
for the fixed effects estimation with MaRaDD interaction term. The average treatment effect 
for restaurants that are not MaRa members is now -1,5 percent which corresponds to a pass-
through of 20 percent. For MaRa restaurants, the treatment effect is the sum of the -1.5 
percent effect and the MaRa “premium” -2,6 percent. Thus, the average effect of tax reduction 
observed in MaRa restaurants was a 4.1 percent reduction in prices, which translates to a 55 
percent pass-through of tax. This is in line with the price change graphs. The increased R
2
 
also indicates that the explanatory power of the model increased when the interaction variable 
for MaRa was added. 
In column 5, the regression results imply an average of one percent decrease in prices in 
stand-alone restaurants, whereas chain restaurants exhibit a 4,6 percent price reduction. Since 
the DD estimate for a stand-alone restaurant is below and for a chain restaurant above the 
overall average DD estimate of 2,3 percent (column 3), it seems that the price reduction was 
to a large extent driven by chain restaurants. Based on the value of R
2
, this model seems to be 
so far the most effective in explaining the variation in the combined price.  
A DID regression with fixed effects is estimated to hotels control group to analyze the 
similarity between the results derived from using different control groups. The estimation 
results are shown in column 6. The causal effect of interest is now -3,0 percent, while the 
regression gave -2,3 percent for the same coefficient when using Estonian restaurants as a 
control group. However, the null hypothesis of the equality of estimates cannot be rejected. 
The consistency of results across alternative control groups is supportive of the validity of the 
results. 
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Table 5. Regression results. 
7.3. Analysis of the weighted price effect 
So far, the estimates are derived for an average firm. The definition of an average firm is 
based on the number of firms. However, what is also of interest is how much the price 
decreased from the consumer perspective; if the majority of servings sold is eaten in a certain 
restaurant, then the price change in that restaurant can by some criteria be considered more 
important than in a restaurant with only one serving sold per day. Thus, by this criterion, the 
restaurants selling a larger proportion of the servings should receive a larger weight in the 
estimation. The weighted average of the reform effect differs from the average effect only if 
the effect in large restaurants is different from the effect in the smaller ones.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS, DID 
OLS, DID 
with 
additional 
controls 
DID, FE 
DID, FE, 
MaRa 
included 
DID, FE, 
Chain 
included 
DID, FE, 
hotels 
            
 treat 0.718*** 0.641***       
 
 
(0.0297) (0.0368)       
 after 0.000318 0.000318 0.000318 0.000318 0.000318 0.007214 
 
(0.0360) (0.0359) (0.000988) (0.000988) (0.000988) (0.005333) 
DD -0.0229 -0.0272 -0.0229*** -0.0147*** -0.0105*** -0.0298*** 
 
(0.0420) (0.0475) (0.00189) (0.00224) (0.00220) ( 0.00557) 
MaRa   0.175***       
 
 
  (0.0361)       
 Chain   -0.158***       
 
 
  (0.0312)       
 S-group   0.279***       
 
 
  (0.0371)       
 MaraDD       -0.0258***   
 
 
      (0.00308)   
 ChainDD         -0.0359*** 
 
 
        (0.00301) 
 Constant 1.374*** 1.398*** 1.869*** 1.869*** 1.866*** 2.728*** 
 
(0.0254) (0.0258) (0.000576) (0.000558) (0.000542) (0.000883) 
              
Observations 2,450 1,544 2,450 2,450 2,434 2,218 
R-squared 0.333 0.376 0.178 0.229 0.276 0.230 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of ytunnus     1,225 1,225 1,217 1,109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Note: within R-squared reported for the fixed effects estimation.        
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The Weighted Least Squares (WLS) model is often used to deal with heteroskedastic 
residuals. In such cases, a larger weight is assigned to observations with large variance to 
downweight their squared errors in the least squares estimation. Thus, the effect of those 
observations on the estimate derived becomes larger. (Stock & Watson 2007, pp. 691-696.) 
Here, the weights are based on the importance of the larger restaurants. There might be a 
relatively small number of large firms, but their proportion of the industry sales is large. The 
mechanism of weighting, however, is analogous as in the situation described above; the 
weight assigned to an individual is in inverse relation to the variance of an observation.  
First, the weights need to be assigned to the restaurants. As the number of servings sold is not 
centralizedly recorded by any quarter, the sales data are used as a proxy for the number of 
servings sold. We have tax data for the restaurants available for year 2009. Main branch 
indicator for each restaurant is also recorded in the data. By the business ID, the data can be 
linked to the right restaurant in the price data. The restaurant services were subject to the VAT 
rate of 22 % in the year 2009 data. As the relative weights are similar whether the data is 
converted to sales amounts or not, the data set is handled in the tax form.  
While the mean of the restaurant-specific taxes stands at 402 057, the median is only 3468,4 
euros. This suggests that there are huge outliers in the data. This is confirmed by the 
examination of the distribution of taxes (Appendix 12). These observations would get a 
disproportionately high significance in the estimation if the raw tax data was assigned to the 
firm weights. This would be well-founded if such large players would indeed to such extent 
dominate the Finnish restaurant industry. However, the inspection of the large values reveals 
that this is not the case here. Some of the restaurants with large sales are listed under a main 
branch other than restaurant industry. This suggests that the sales consist primarily of other 
business activity than restaurant business. Others are chains, with all chain’s restaurants listed 
under the same business ID.  
The proportion of the actual restaurant business is hard to solve. Attempts could be made to 
gather information on the conglomerates’ restaurant activity from the businesses’ financial 
statements. However, this information is not available for all firms. Additionally, for properly 
allocating the taxes paid by each sample restaurant, information would be needed on the 
number of restaurants operating within a chain. Otherwise, the individual restaurant that 
operates within a chain would be allocated the total amount of the chain’s sales. Because 
these actions would cause unnecessarily inconvenience and even at their best result in 
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defective tax estimates, the approach taken here is to limit the upper-level sales (taxes) by a 
partially arbitrary procedure. Thus, the results derived are only suggestive in nature and must 
be interpreted with caution. 
First, from the restaurants that were listed under main branch other than restaurant branch, the 
weight for those who paid more than 100 000 euros of taxes in 2009 was limited. From those 
restaurants that were left with more than 100 000 euros of taxes paid, all were chain 
restaurants. Thus, their weights were divided by ten. Then, the Estonian restaurants, with no 
tax information at hand, were each allocated a weight of the size of the mean weight of 
Finnish restaurants. The modified distribution is found in Appendix 13. Note that the 
frequency at the location of mean is disproportionately high due to the mean weight being 
allocated to all Estonian restaurants.  
Table 6 exhibits the results of the fixed effects estimation with weights. In the first column, 
the estimates from a regression, where the tax distribution was not limited, are reported. The 
estimate implies an effect of -6,5 percent on the consumer price. However, setting limitations 
to the highest weights essentially changes the results; the coefficient for DD is now almost 
one percentage point lower. The estimates for the regression, when applying the limited 
weights on restaurants, are shown in column 2. It seems that the price change estimates are 
not robust for the largest restaurants; there is asymmetry between the treatment effects in 
large and small restaurants. Thus, how the weights are defined substantially affect the 
estimates derived of the causal effect of the tax reduction. This is confirmed also by the 
results in column 3, where the upper limit for the tax-based weights is capped to 100 000 
euros; the effect of interest decreases by 4 per Milles.   
However, conclusions can be drawn of the direction of the effect of weighting the restaurants 
by the proxy for amount of servings sold. The large restaurants showed a larger tendency to 
pass the tax forward to consumer prices in the context of the tax reform. The sales-weighted 
average of the causal effect of the tax change on prices ranges between -5,3 and -6,5 percent; 
these correspond to a 71-88 percent pass-through of tax. Note, however, that the upper limit to 
the estimate is based on distorted weights, as other-than-restaurant business operations add to 
the significance of the largest firms. The other results are also very sensitive to the choice of 
weights, and thus very suggestive.    
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Table 6. Weighted regression results. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
FE, WLS with unlimited 
distribution of taxes 
FE, WLS with 
limited 
distribution of 
taxes 
FE, WLS with a 
more limited 
distribution of taxes  
        
after 0.000315 0.000315 0.000315 
 
(0.000977) (0.000977) (0.000977) 
DD -0.0646*** -0.0565*** -0.0525*** 
 
(0.00373) (0.00248) (0.00256) 
Constant 2.013*** 1.907*** 1.893*** 
 
(0.00132) (0.000777) (0.00076) 
        
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 
R-squared 0.807 0.690 0.621 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of ytunnus 1,113 1,113 1,113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Note: within R-squared reported for the fixed effects estimation.     
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8. Discussion 
 
Based on the inspection of the price change using both graphs and summary statistics, it 
seems that the tax change translated into lower prices. The regression analysis with the OLS 
DID model supports the interpretation; the estimates derived of the causal effect of the tax 
reduction imply a price change of -2,3 percent. However, the results are not statistically 
significant. The use of fixed effects estimation decreases the amount of unexplained variation 
for each observation and thus provides more efficient estimates. The significant estimates 
show a 2,3 percent price reduction as a response to the tax change. The pass-through rate of 
tax is then 31 percent. 
The tax reduction is, on average, undershifted. This does not imply any definitive conclusions 
about the competitive model in the market; with all forms of competition, undershifting is 
possible under certain assumptions. The examination of partial equilibrium model for 
perfectly competitive markets suggests that undershifting could be related to the demand 
being relatively more elastic than supply. The Finnish-level estimates of the demand elasticity 
by Soppi (2006) are derived from Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), and suggest that the 
elasticity of demand for restaurant services be -0,84. Edgerton et al (1996) apply the same 
system and derive a value of 1,02 for the Finnish price elasticity. Both elasticity estimates 
indicate high demand responses to price changes and could thus suggest relatively inelastic 
supply. In Subsection 3.1.2., the supply characteristics in the industry were shortly discussed. 
It was claimed that labor-intensive services exhibit relatively high supply elasticity, as labor 
input can be easily adjusted and entry to the market is facilitated. More information on the 
supply characteristics would be needed to draw conclusions of the sources of undershifting.  
In the models including market power, undershifting is related to the demand characteristics. 
The price responses are below the size of the tax when the demand is concave. Concave 
demand would induce large demand changes for small price reductions on high price levels 
and small ones for large reductions on the lower price levels. This option cannot be excluded 
given the information available.  
Another characteristic of the results is the asymmetry of price responses in different 
subgroups. The price reduction was higher for the chain and MaRa restaurants. The chain 
restaurants, with supposedly larger amount of market power than the stand-alone ones, show a 
differing response compared to the estimate derived for a representative restaurant from the 
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basic fixed effects OLS model. In large proportion of chain restaurants, the tax reduction is 
passed fully on to consumer prices (Exhibit 8, Table 4). The same pattern is observed in the 
MaRa restaurants, although the proportion of restaurants with complete pass-through is 
smaller.  
Exhibit 7 demonstrated that the price reduction was largest for lunch prices. In the beginning 
of July 2010, the value of the luncheon voucher, a popular Finnish fringe benefit, decreased 
from 9,50 to 8,80 euros (Taloussanomat 2010b). This corresponds to -7,4 percent, the 
computational value of the tax reduction. Luottokunta, the issuer of the luncheon voucher, 
reports that 90 000 meals a day are paid using the luncheon voucher (Luottokunta). This 
number cannot be considered negligible; the decrease in luncheon voucher value might even 
induce an effect in market pricing. Thus, the luncheon voucher factor might contribute to the 
exceptionally large drop in the lunch prices.  
An element also present in Kosonen’s (2010) study is the dependence of the level of pass-
through on the form of business. Kosonen found that the large corporations exhibited the 
largest and the sole proprietors the smallest pass-through rates in the context of a tax reform 
on hairdressing. Correspondingly, our study presents highest pass-through rates to chains and 
the largest restaurants, measured by the sales. For example, the S-group corporation with a 20 
percent market share (SOK Corporation Annual Report 2010) exhibits full pass-through in 80 
percent of its restaurants. This might seem surprising, as in theory full pass-through was only 
found to reflect perfect competition or Bertrand competition outcome. Belonging to a chain is 
not necessarily a sign of significant market power, but the degree of market power is certainly 
higher than for an average stand-alone restaurant. A full pass-through in chain restaurants, 
observed in the market immediately following the tax change, is then likely to reflect 
something else than competitive market behavior; the reasons for the producer to pass the tax 
reductions fully to the consumer price might be strategic, or they may follow from public 
pressure.  
As explained in Section 6.1, the tax reduction was followed closely in the Finnish media both 
before and after the tax change. A web site www.alv13.fi
8
 was founded to publish a black list 
of restaurants that did not pass the tax on to prices (Helsingin Sanomat 2010). The large 
restaurants with higher customer levels might have found the public attention more oppressive 
than the smaller ones. The inquiries of the price reduction might be more frequent in these 
                                                     
8
 The web site is no longer operating.  
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restaurants, and in the absence of reduction the large chain restaurants might attract a lot of 
negative attention. Partially, this is field of behavioral economics. Additionally, the big 
restaurants can simply have afforded to decrease prices; larger market power is likely to 
translate to higher mark-ups. Large chain restaurants may also benefit from increasing returns 
to scale in their operations. 
Inspection of MaRa restaurants reveals that the association consists of restaurants with high 
customer levels. Although only 20-25 percent of Finnish restaurants belong to the association, 
they cover 80 to 90 percent of the sales of the industry (Nuutinen 2010). Thus, the right 
interpretation of the higher pass-through estimates for the subgroup is not necessarily that 
belonging to MaRa would be driving the result; i.e. that the estimate would be causal. This 
would actually be quite improbable; although MaRa campaigned for the pass-through of tax 
reduction, it does not have command over the pricing policies of its member restaurants. The 
restaurants belonging to the association could just possess certain characteristics that affect 
the outcome. The inspection of MaRa restaurants reveals that a slight majority of these 
restaurants operate within a chain. That fact, accompanied by the above-mentioned 
information of the disparity between the amount of members and the amount of sales by the 
member restaurants, illustrates that MaRa is an association of large restaurants. Thus, the 
differing results for MaRa could be driven by the selection of the restaurants in the 
association. 
The fit of the above models, as measured by R
2
, is below 50 percent. However, this is not 
found problematic, as the aim of the study was to provide estimates on the tax change’s 
average effect on prices, not to model the phenomenon.  
The sales-weighted pass-through estimates in Section 7.3 were above those for a 
representative restaurant. A 71-88 percent level of pass-through was found, depending on the 
definition of weights. There was no clear-cut way in defining the weights, though; more 
specific information would have been needed on the sales per restaurant. However, a positive 
relationship is observed between the level of pass-through and the sales of the restaurant. 
Thus, the price change observed in the consumption of the restaurant services by an average 
consumer is larger than the estimates from the unweighted regressions suggest.  
In most restaurants, the absolute changes in prices were small (Appendix 14). The mean for 
the change in absolute values ranged from -0,02 euros for coffee to -0,27 euros for lunch. If 
the demand characteristics are such that consumers do not react to such small price changes, 
66 
 
 
 
i.e. the demand is inelastic for small scale price variations, no demand effect is generated. 
Thus, to analyze the materialization of the policy objectives, information is needed on the 
demand effects of the reform. What can be concluded from our study is that the reform was 
partly ineffective in inducing demand effects, as the full pass-through of taxes to prices was 
not realized.  
A cautionary word was given in Subsection 6.2.1 of the potentially differing trend behavior of 
the primary control group. The past development in restaurant prices has, on average, been 
more rapid in the Estonian restaurants. Therefore, the distribution of the change in Estonian 
prices was compared to those of the alternative control group. Those were found to greatly 
resemble each other (Appendix 10). Also, the average change in the combined price in 
Estonia was not significantly different from zero. If the pattern of more rapid growth in 
Estonia would have continued across the study period, Finnish restaurants should have 
experienced a period of negative price growth. This has not been typical of Finland in the past 
(Exhibit 3). The Estonian price development is thus considered as a plausible counterfactual 
for the Finnish price development. However, if the Estonian control group had actually 
exaggerated the level of counterfactual price development, the real pass-through estimates 
would have been smaller than derived in Chapter 7. If the Finnish counterfactual price growth 
would have exceeded that of Estonia, the real estimates of the level of pass-through would 
have been larger. 
The pass-through estimates derived here are in line with the previous research on tax 
reduction. Though tax reduction in particular has not been studied extensively, there are a few 
references to contrast our results with. Doyle & Samphantharak (2008) studied sales tax 
incidence in the gasoline market. They find undershifting of taxes in the context of tax 
suspensions. The short-run pass-through estimate is 70 percent. Kosonen (2010) found a 60 
percent pass-through in a Finnish tax reform from 2009, where a tax reduction was targeted at 
hairdressing and small repair services. These treatment effects correspond to the weighted 
estimates of Section 7.3; however, the unweighted estimates of average pass-through are 
notably smaller. 
The Finnish tax reduction on restaurant services was also subject to other studies. The results 
by Peltoniemi and Varjonen (2011) are derived using a different method and sample. The 
average effect is counted by weighting the changes for different restaurant types by the CPI-
based consumption shares of those types. By the method, the price reduction is 4,4 percent on 
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average, driven by large and MaRa restaurants. The non-organized restaurants exhibit a price 
reduction of 1,8 percent. The results correspond to the results derived in Chapter 7. The 
deviation of the average effect from our estimates is likely to result from different approach to 
weighting. The treatment effect for non-organized restaurants, however, is similar to our 
estimate of 1,5 percent (Table 5, column 4). The estimates from our study are also consistent 
with those of Harju and Kosonen (2010), derived from the use of the same data set and 
method. 
9. Conclusions 
 
The aim of the thesis has been to study the normative aspects of differentiated tax rates and 
the positive aspects of tax changes and to complement the theory with an overview of the 
empirical research on the subject. Additionally, a case study of a VAT reform on Finnish 
restaurant industry was included to contribute to the still understudied field of tax incidence. 
The motivation for the research spurred from the lack of consensus among researchers on the 
implications of tax changes. The increasing application of VAT as a tax instrument highlights 
the need of practical information on its effects on the sectors involved and the economy on the 
whole and on the fulfillment of the aimed targets.  
The tax reforms have been subject to a limited amount of research. In the majority of these 
studies, the price changes following the tax changes have been the effect of interest. However, 
the results on the forward-shifting of taxes remain ambiguous. Also, few comprehensive 
studies on tax changes’ impacts on the economy on the whole have been conducted. This 
thesis contributes to the research by utilizing a natural experiment design and applying the 
difference-in-differences method to derive the causal effect of an exogenous change in tax 
policy in the Finnish restaurant industry in 2010. The method used corresponds to that used 
by Doyle & Samphantharak (2008) in studying the consequences of tax suspensions and, later, 
reinstatements. The analysis aims to determine the tax reform’s effects on consumer price. We 
concentrate on deriving two principal estimates of interest. The first one is the simple average 
of the causal effect of tax change on consumer prices based on the number of restaurants. The 
second one is a sales-weighted average of the reform’s effect; an estimate that aims to better 
reflect how the tax changes affected the consumers’ spending on these services. We find that 
prices decrease following the tax change, but not to the whole extent of tax reduction. The 
sales-weighted average of price decrease exhibits a higher pass-through rate than the simple 
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count-based average, revealing a higher tendency of price reduction in more popular 
restaurants.   
The lack of estimates on supply and demand characteristics challenges the interpretation of 
the results. Undershifting could result from relatively inelastic supply in a competitive 
industry or, alternatively, from the exercise of market power. We rest more on the latter 
alternative, as the supply should be relatively easily adjusted in the labor-intensive industry in 
question, especially as the Finnish economy did not exhibit full employment in 2010. Our 
results correspond with Doyle & Samphantharak (2008), who found less-than-full shifting of 
taxes in the context of tax reduction, and Kosonen (2010), finding evidence of undershifting 
of tax reduction on hairdressing.  
The individual pass-through rates of the firm seem to be linked to the size of the firm, the 
largest ones exhibiting highest pass-through rates. Also restaurants that belong to a chain are 
found to respond more intensely to tax reduction. This could be attributed to a potentially 
more elastic supply in the larger companies; also, it could be a result of engaging to Bertrand 
competition. The suggestive analysis provided here emphasizes the need for further research, 
encompassing also the demand and employment effects of the VAT reforms. Also, the 
analysis needs to be industry-specific, as the outcomes seem to be essentially tied to the 
particular demand and supply characteristics of the industry. As these characteristics differ 
across industries, the results from one sector may not be directly generalized to others. 
Studying VAT incidence is important not only to contribute to the research on tax incidence 
in general, but also to provide practical information about the tax reform in particular. The 
restaurant services are often characterized as luxury goods. Based on the research by 
Varjonen & Aalto (2010, pp. 40), the highest income quintile spends nearly two and a half 
times more money on “outsourcing” meal services than the lowest quintile. The number, 
although also including the expenses on the convenience food, suggests that if the tax reform 
did not achieve its objectives of increasing demand and employment, it became merely a 
subvention to the highest income groups. Although further information on demand and supply 
characteristics and employment effects would be necessary to evaluate the reform’s success 
on the whole, the consumer price change alone provides valuable information on the extent of 
the potential demand effects. 
Previous studies on tax incidence by Doyle & Samphantharak (2008) and Alm et al (2009) 
have incorporated spatial analysis in their work. Alm et al compare responses in prices 
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between the urban and rural areas. Spatial analysis on the effects of the tax reduction would 
be engrossing in our study too; comparing otherwise similar restaurants in areas with differing 
restaurants-to-inhabitants density would allow exploring the asymmetry of responses based on 
the level of competition. The demand effects could be studied by comparing the development 
in restaurants’ sales levels in Finland and Estonia. As the objectives of the European 
Commission also included the reduction of the size of the informal sector of the economy, the 
development of the grey economy should also be examined.   
To conclude, the varying results of the effects of commodity tax changes further emphasize 
the need for case-specific consideration of tax reforms. Our study adds to the findings by 
Doyle & Samphantharak (2008), Kosonen (2010) and Besley & Rosen (1999) and 
demonstrates that the full pass-through is not a self-evident outcome of a tax change, but 
rather a special case. Comprehensive research incorporating also demand and employment 
effects is still crucial to complement the field of research of tax incidence.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. VAT rates applicable in EU member countries.  
 
Source: European Commission Taxation and Customs Union 2011.   
77 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Partial equilibrium: Perfect competition. The impact of imposing an ad valorem tax t on 
producer price p. 
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Appendix 3. Partial equilibrium: Perfect competition. The impact of imposing an ad valorem tax t on 
consumer price q. 
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Appendix 4. Partial equilibrium: Monopoly facing linear demand. The impact of imposing an ad 
valorem tax t on consumer price q. 
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Assume linear demand: D(q)=a-q and constant marginal costs C’(D(q))=c: 
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A derivative with respect to t: 
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Appendix 5. Consumer prices by country. 
 
Estonia 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meal 1 706 6.52 4.03 0.29 25.25 
Meal 2 656 6.42 3.78 0.24 24.29 
Vegetarian meal 676 3.71 2.02 0.32 14.70 
Pizza 92 3.80 1.92 0.45 8.95 
Appetizer 510 3.89 2.35 0.32 20.45 
Dessert 716 2.44 1.47 0.32 19.17 
Non-alcoholic beverage 448 1.24 0.47 0.38 4.79 
Lunch 366 4.16 2.67 0.89 15.34 
Lunch soup 130 2.42 1.00 0.89 5.75 
Beer 414 2.28 0.72 0.89 4.79 
Wine 222 3.95 6.61 1.02 62.31 
Coffee 118 1.03 0.43 0.26 2.24 
Latte 88 1.62 0.54 0.64 3.45 
Combined price 768 4.41 2.24 0.32 16.19 
Finland 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meal 1 1562 11.27 7.44 1.00 55.00 
Meal 2 1054 10.57 6.34 0.60 59.00 
Vegetarian meal 926 9.30 4.67 2.10 65.00 
Pizza 486 8.62 2.33 3.00 15.00 
Appetizer 634 5.74 2.79 1.00 19.00 
Dessert 282 4.50 2.87 0.80 14.00 
Non-alcoholic beverage 512 2.34 0.62 1.10 6.35 
Lunch 814 8.27 2.66 2.80 29.00 
Lunch soup 190 6.24 1.15 3.00 12.50 
Beer 298 4.38 0.73 2.50 6.20 
Wine 288 7.40 10.10 1.00 90.00 
Coffee 116 1.51 0.41 0.60 3.00 
Latte 56 2.68 0.66 1.90 4.20 
Combined price 1690 8.87 4.40 1.50 44.13 
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Appendix 6. Distribution of restaurant types in Finland and Estonia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Restaurant type Estonia Finland  
Spanish 0.3 0.3 
Fine dining 19.3 8.3 
Italian  4.3 16.1 
Cafe 17.4 12.9 
Chinese, Indian, Thai or Japanese 4.5 6.2 
Other ethnic 13.1 1.0 
Tex mex  0.5 1.4 
Turkish 0.5 3.8 
General restaurant 16.8 27.1 
Gas station 
 
3.1 
Staff or student restaurant 
 
4.4 
Other 23.5 15.5 
Total 100 % 100 % 
n 800 1,903 
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Appendix 7. Consumer price changes by country and meal category. 
Estonia 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meal 1 353 0.003013 0.040174 -0.11778 0.682218 
Meal 2 328 -0.00171 0.045835 -0.76136 0.167054 
Vegetarian meal 338 0.000677 0.056698 -0.8473 0.336472 
Pizza 46 0.001856 0.012586 0 0.08536 
Appetizer 255 -0.00092 0.034123 -0.33647 0.37949 
Dessert 358 0.003309 0.053523 -0.28768 0.628609 
Non-alcoholic beverage 224 0.00047 0.00704 0 0.105361 
Lunch 183 -0.00356 0.087328 -1.00145 0.435318 
Lunch soup 65 -0.00114 0.021681 -0.15415 0.080043 
Beer 207 -0.00038 0.005419 -0.07796 0 
Wine 111 0.000614 0.019116 -0.15415 0.074108 
Coffee 59 0 0 0 0 
Latte 44 0 0 0 0 
Combined price 384 0.000511 0.022739 -0.16946 0.147761 
Finland 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meal 1 781 -0.02304 0.05398 -0.45495 0.336472 
Meal 2 527 -0.01871 0.049915 -0.43078 0.287682 
Vegetarian meal 463 -0.02074 0.039299 -0.12516 0.182322 
Pizza 243 -0.00881 0.045219 -0.15415 0.405465 
Appetizer 317 -0.01991 0.069152 -0.40547 0.710242 
Dessert 141 -0.03355 0.079266 -0.52452 0.251315 
Non-alcoholic beverage 256 -0.01598 0.047258 -0.40547 0.154151 
Lunch 407 -0.03179 0.05071 -0.37118 0.14994 
Lunch soup 95 -0.03788 0.037454 -0.11488 0.04919 
Beer 149 0.003999 0.035988 -0.25131 0.251315 
Wine 116 0.000857 0.022863 -0.12921 0.068993 
Coffee 58 -0.01238 0.047012 -0.24512 0.127833 
Latte 28 -0.01941 0.044117 -0.1431 0 
Combined price 845 -0.02276 0.04742 -0.37118 0.336472 
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Appendix 8. Consumer price change by meal category. 
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Appendix 9. Consumer price change versus the alternative control group of alcoholic beverages.  
 
Appendix 10. Distribution of consumer price change in the alternative control groups. 
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Appendix 11. Consumer price change in S-group. 
  
Appendix 12. The distribution of value added taxes paid (22%), Finnish restaurants. 
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Appendix 13. The modified distribution of value added taxes paid (22%), Finnish restaurants. 
 
Appendix 14. The absolute change in consumer prices in Finland (in euros). 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meal 1 781 -0.26 0.61 -5.30 5.40 
Meal 2 527 -0.20 0.60 -4.20 6.00 
Vegetarian meal 463 -0.19 0.40 -2.00 2.00 
Pizza 243 -0.08 0.39 -1.00 3.00 
Appetizer 317 -0.10 0.35 -2.50 3.00 
Dessert 141 -0.10 0.33 -2.00 2.00 
Non-alcoholic beverage 256 -0.04 0.12 -1.00 0.50 
Lunch 407 -0.27 0.45 -4.00 1.10 
Lunch soup 95 -0.23 0.24 -0.70 0.60 
Beer 149 0.02 0.15 -1.00 1.00 
Wine 116 -0.01 0.43 -4.00 2.00 
Coffee 58 -0.02 0.09 -0.50 0.30 
Latte 28 -0.06 0.13 -0.40 0.00 
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